In the footsteps of heavy cruisers. Read online "heavy cruisers of japan" Displacement of a heavy cruiser

The high state of German technology and engineering thought simply did not allow the creation of an obviously unsuccessful project, although in the case of cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type, one can partly say that such an attempt was made. In general, comparing warships of different nations, built in accordance with different strategic and tactical ideas, is a thankless task. This is especially true during the Second World War, when the priority was shifted from factors related to purely artillery combat (the number and quality of guns, armor) to “instrumental” elements such as fire control systems, radars, sonars and other high-tech equipment. Nevertheless, we will try to give overall assessment German version of the heavy cruiser.

First of all, it is worth noting that despite the actual absence of displacement restrictions, which annoyed all other countries so much, the Germans failed to create either a more heavily armed or better protected ship. The Hipper's armament (eight 203mm guns) is equivalent to the "mandatory minimum" for Washington cruisers. At the same time, American ships of the same class had 9 guns each, and Japanese ships - 10. Among the eight-gun heavy cruisers of the second generation, the Germans had perhaps the weakest defense. "Algeri", one of the main potential opponents, had thicker belt and deck armor (respectively 110 mm + 40 mm bulkhead and 80 mm). The Italian cruisers of the "Pola" type were even more heavily armored. The belt of the American "Wichita" - the last pre-war project, created for still a limited displacement, had a thickness of 163 mm, albeit on a smaller area than that of the "Germans". Against this background, the 80-mm belt, reinforced with a 30-mm bevel (which provided protection, approximately corresponding to 110-130 mm, taking into account the diversity of armor and depending on the distance), did not look very impressive. In any case, the traditional principle of building German ships - enhanced protection, even at the expense of weapons - was not followed when creating a project for heavy cruisers. Even the most powerfully armed Japanese heavy cruisers, smaller in displacement and more high-speed, had about the same level of reservation (an inclined belt of 102 mm, albeit on a much smaller area). As a result, solidly protected large light cruisers armed with 12-15 six-inch guns (British “cities” and “colonies”, American “Brooklyns” and “Clevelands”) became dangerous opponents for the “Germans”, especially at short distances, where a large role played the density of the fire.

Everything that has been said about booking "hippers" can be said about their underwater protection. The bullet system with a thin (20-mm) main anti-torpedo bulkhead provided no more safety than the 40-mm Algeri armored bulkhead with a developed double-sided system, or than the same bullets plus the 25-mm bulkhead of Japanese heavy cruisers. However, this fact only testifies to the fundamental impossibility of providing sufficient underwater protection from modern torpedoes to any ship of this class. Survivability during underwater explosions was largely ensured by the large buoyancy reserve of the "box" itself and the careful design and construction of all watertight bulkheads. Well, also good luck with a specific defeat. A break in the stern of the "Eugen" seems to indicate insufficient strength of the hull, but its behavior during an atomic explosion speaks of maintaining quite decent survivability even after a long service in the absence of proper "care".

Enough has already been said about tormenting the power plant. It is only worth noting that it did not provide particularly high driving characteristics. Slightly over 32.5 knots per measured mile is by no means a record speed. The seaworthiness of the "hippers" was satisfactory, but nothing more. For the Atlantic, the hull turned out to be rather small; the bow end was heavily flooded with water in bad weather, even after the "build-up" of the "Atlantic" stem.

A consistent consideration of moderate combat qualities may raise the question: where did such a significant excess displacement "evaporate"? The answer to this question can be obtained by considering the auxiliary weapons and equipment of the German heavy cruisers. If their armament does not look very impressive, then fire control systems, perhaps, have no analogues among this class of ships. The complete duplication of the KDP and computing centers of the main and anti-aircraft caliber and their equipment with high-class optics and equipment gave the "hippers" almost "battleship" capabilities. Wichita ". All this took about 2500 tons. A lot of weight "ate" the attempts of the Germans to give their ships as much versatility as possible. Aviation equipment, 12 torpedo tubes with spare torpedoes, supplies and supplies also accounted for a noticeable part of the load.

This versatility and richness of equipment led to two very important consequences from the point of view of project evaluation. First, the size of the team has grown dramatically. Instead of 600-800 people on the cruisers of England, France and the United States, the crew on the "hippers" reached 1400-1600 people, and in military campaigns, additional sailors were usually taken in addition to the set. Thus, heavy cruisers, like all large ships in Germany, absorbed a large number of scarce trained personnel and, at first glance, Hitler's purely voluntary decision to withdraw them to the reserve after the "New Year's battle" in 1943 made a certain sense: the crew of one ship was equal to the number of crews of an entire flotilla of submarines.

The second consequence was price. The Hipper and her sisterships turned out to be extremely expensive ships. There are many reasons for this, in particular - the high cost work force in Germany (fascism paid well for skilled labor at military enterprises), but the high cost of science-intensive weapons and equipment, which were saturated with heavy cruisers, also played a significant role. Their value has steadily increased: from "Hipper" (85.9 million Reichsmarks) to "Prince Eugen" (104.5 million). It is enough to compare these figures with the price of "pocket battleships" (80–90 million) and real battleships of the Scharnhorst type (about 175 million) and Bismarck (180–200 million) to understand how dearly they were bought not too many advantages of German heavy cruisers. Instead of two units of this class, it was theoretically possible to build an extra battleship, a ship, in all respects (in terms of protection, weapons, range, degree of threat to the enemy and the possibility of diverting his forces) several times more useful. Or have 7 "pocket battleships" instead of the 5-ship series of heavy cruisers. This option seems to be especially preferable from the point of view of trying to wage a cruising war. But the comparison with the cost of submarines "clogs" everything: according to the estimates of German specialists, each "hipper" is equivalent to about 25 submarines, which could undoubtedly bring much more benefit.

The high cost of the "Germans" is even more striking in comparison with the heavy cruisers of other countries. In comparable prices, the early units cost over £ 4 million and Eugen nearly £ 5 million, while the UK Counties cost around £ 2 million. The difference is even wider when you take into account the much higher operating costs in the case of German cruisers, associated with a huge crew and high maintenance requirements for a capricious mechanical installation.

As a result, claims to create a "large fleet" cost the Third Reich dearly, both in terms of the money and human costs themselves, and in the sense of diverting them from other options for use. Heavy cruisers are perhaps the most striking illustration of this. Created to operate as part of squadrons of a single fleet of the type of the Open Sea Fleet, they never found their "niche" in combat use, since the most striking episodes of their activities associated with the shelling of coastal targets in the last stage of World War II can hardly be considered as such. ...

However, not all so simple. It may seem paradoxical, but despite all of the above negative sides, the German project was largely the prototype of modern cruisers. Indeed, the Soviet Sverdlov-class cruisers built after the war are very close in layout, characteristics and equipment to the 6-inch version of the hippers. Approximately similar in parameters (although more heavily armed) ships were designed by the British after the displacement restrictions were lifted. The stake not on the brute power of the salvo, but on ensuring high-quality fire control, on the higher versatility of combat units, became the main trend in the further development of the cruiser class, for which, however, history did not leave much time.

The war ended on September 2, 1945, and the victors were immediately faced with the question: what to do with the huge fleets that were inherited? However, to be honest, only two powers faced this problem: Great Britain and the United States, the rest, having calculated their losses, found out that they, in fact, had no fleet left. First of all, this applies to France and the Soviet Union, the first "heroically" flooded its entire fleet in Toulon, and the second ... True, Stalin had great ambitions even before the war, but not a large fleet, and they were pretty battered by the Luftwaffe pilots.

Great Britain was the first to get down to business, for its shattered economy the maintenance of the fleet was a stone on the neck of a drowning man. The "Mistress of the Seas" was forced to admit that from now on her fleet would be strong enough, but only second-rate, to compete with the United States was now simply unthinkable. And no international treaties could change this.

The first to be scrapped were the old battleships that had outlived their time, followed by the cruisers. This is not surprising, because even unfinished aircraft carriers of the "Colossus" type, and they had to be attached all over the world, since there were still hunters. The heavy cruisers lingered for a short time after the end of the war, although one of them managed to distinguish himself, but not in the same way as the British cruisers had previously done.

But the light cruisers went from hand to hand. It is difficult to say exactly how, but in 1948 the British somehow managed to foist on the Indians the old-aged "Achilles", which received the name "Delhi". Later "Nigeria" went to India, "Newfoundland" and "Ceylon" went to Peru, "Diadem" - to Pakistan, "Royalist" - to New Zealand.

What about the new ships? Never mind. The history of the development of cruisers in the Royal Navy is over. At the end of the war, projects of large modern cruisers were prepared, designed taking into account the experience of the Pacific War, but they remained on paper. Moreover, of the already laid down 5 Tiger-class cruisers, only 3 were completed, and even then with a long delay - work was resumed only in 1954. In addition, they turned into helicopter cruisers, which was quite reasonable since the era of artillery ships was over. Therefore, the project of the cruiser, prepared in 1947, remained on paper.

The French, as we have already said, completed the De Grasse cruiser in the air defense version and built the first and last air defense cruiser Colbert in the history of the “keel-built” air defense cruiser. That is, the two leading maritime powers no longer laid no one artillery cruiser.

The United States did exactly the same as its European allies. All the ships of pre-war construction were scrapped, and the American fleet quickly got rid of the newer light cruisers. Heavy cruisers held up, they had a large displacement, and therefore had a margin for modernization. The Americans completed the Des Moines-class heavy cruisers laid down in 1945, and the Newport News, which was part of this series, became the only artillery cruiser laid down in the West after the end of the war, more precisely on October 1, 1945.

But the command of the Soviet fleet acted completely differently. First, 5 cruisers of the 68-K project were completed, although most historians claim that the cruiser project was corrected (hence the letter K appeared), taking into account the experience of the war, in fact, this is not entirely true. Already at the very beginning of the 1950s, the West switched to installing 76-mm machine guns as anti-aircraft guns, considering that even 40-mm machine guns are not very effective against modern aircraft. Project 68-K cruisers had only 8 100-mm universal guns and a mass of 37-mm assault rifles. But these assault rifles could not be compared either with the British Hasemeier-Bofors, or with the American Mk 2 with the Mk 63 control post, since both of these installations had individual radar guidance. That is, even by the standards of 1945, Chapaev was defenseless in an air attack. Let's remember that the Yamato had a total of about 200 anti-aircraft artillery barrels, but did it help him a lot?

And the decision to build a Project 68-bis cruiser looks completely strange. Okay, Stalin personally insisted on the construction of the monsters of Project 82, but who forced Admiral Kuznetsov to order obviously outdated light cruisers? For them, Joseph Vissarionovich did not harbor an unhealthy addiction. There is some truth in Khrushchev's words about Kuznetsov: "He wants to win tomorrow's war with yesterday's weapons," but Khrushchev was a little mistaken, he should have said "with the weapons of the day before yesterday's war." The lead cruiser of this series "Sverdlov" was laid down on October 15, 1949, and the arguments of Soviet theorists about artillery battles at extreme distances and the "superiority" of "Sverdlov" over the American "Cleveland" in such a collision, as well as lamentations about the voluntarism of Khrushchev, look ridiculous. these ships are scrapped. This is akin to Yaroslavna's crying about the bitter fate of the Izmail-class battle cruisers that were scrapped in the 1920s. It was not enough for the Soviet Union to have more tanks than the rest of the world put together, so still light cruisers in the same proportion had to be started, because the admirals intended to build as many as 25 units. Why?!

Apparently, in order to amuse the inflamed pride, our historians began to tell various fables about the black envy of the British, which was caused by the incomparable qualities of these cruisers. There are tales of a dead diver who examined the underwater part of the Sverdlov during his visit to England, and a fable about some midget submarine that perished in the Baltiysk (Pillau) area. Lord, will you seriously assert that a light diver will be able to remove a theoretical drawing of the underwater part of the hull, and even at night, if you believe the tales ?!

However, in the first post-war years, cruisers of old projects were still operating in all fleets. A large naval war became impossible, and in small conflicts the shortcomings of old ships did not appear too clearly.

Yes, cruisers still had to take part in small wars and conflicts. On April 20, 1949, the British frigate Amethyst sailed from Shanghai up the Yangtze to replace the destroyer Consort, which was guarding the British embassy in Nanjing. Quite unexpectedly, it was fired upon by the artillery of the Chinese communists. One of the shells hit the bridge, fatally wounding the captain and injuring the helmsman, as a result the sloop ran aground near Rose Island. The ship still managed to send a radiogram, informing that it ran aground and had heavy losses, as the generator compartment was destroyed by new hits, and the bow units could no longer turn. The stern managed to fire several shots, but was destroyed by a direct hit. After that, the wounded Senior Lieutenant Weston ordered a ceasefire and the evacuation of the crew to the southern bank of the river, occupied by the Kuomintang. In total, the British crew lost 22 people killed and 31 wounded.

The Consort came to the rescue, which was also fired upon, although it carried as many as seven British flags. By the return fire of the destroyer, the communist batteries were forced to silence, after which the Consort tried to pull the Amethyst from the shallows. The attempt failed, and as a result of the shelling, 10 people died on the destroyer and 3 more were wounded, and he was forced to retreat.

As a result, on 25 April the heavy cruiser London under the flag of Vice Admiral Madden and the frigate Black Swan moved upriver. Madden hoped the Chinese would show restraint at the sight of the heavy cruiser, but the Communists fired on him too. "London" responded with all the guns and received several hits himself. Another 13 people were killed and 30 were injured. The frigate remained aground, and the damaged cruiser went to England, where it was scrapped. Only on July 30, the "Amethyst" took off from the shallows and at full speed rushed down the river past the Chinese batteries. On August 11, he finally joined the British ships in Hong Kong.

By the way, the Chinese have long claimed that the Amethyst was the first to open fire, and only in 1988 did they admit that it was their provocation. Another interesting detail. The ship's cat "Amethyst" Simon was seriously injured during the shelling, but the doctor bandaged his wounds, and the cat remained on duty. During a long forced stop, the frigate was attacked by many rats, and Simon heroically fought off all their sorties. For his heroism, the cat was awarded the Deakin Medal (the highest British award for animals in military service) and the Blue Cross Society Medal (a special award for animals established in Great Britain back in 1897). Simon's name is inscribed on a plaque at the national memorial, along with others who distinguished themselves during the incident. But the heavy cruiser clearly had nothing to brag about.

The mysterious fate of the light cruiser Aurora, which the British handed over to the Chinese fleet on May 19, 1948, as compensation for the ships captured in Hong Kong, is also connected with China. It was renamed "Chongqing" and became the flagship of the Chinese fleet, and even took part in the battles. But in February 1949, the cruiser left Shanghai and surrendered to the communists in Wei Hai Wei on March 2. An absolutely unprecedented incident in the history of war at sea! Of course there were isolated cases escape of small ships with all the crew, but that the whole cruiser ...

It was immediately renamed "Chongqing". Don't ask me for details. English historians report that the name "Chung King" was changed to "Tchoung King", but whether it was a different hieroglyphic spelling I cannot say. Subsequent events are also described in a strange way. It seems that somewhere in the 20th of March it was sunk by Kuomintang aviation in the port of Taku. We have only one certainty - the cruiser was indeed lying on board near the pier in Taku. Later, the ship was raised with the help of Soviet specialists, but in their memoirs there is no indication of damage to the cruiser. It can be assumed that he was either flooded by his team, or simply capsized due to the negligence of the same team.

The former Aurora was no longer commissioned, but it was renamed three more times: first in the Huang He, then in Beijin, that is, Beijing, and, finally, in Guangzhou. Sometime in the 1960s, the ship was dismantled for metal.

Literally immediately after this, the Korean War began, the last war in which classic artillery ships participated. By the way, it was during the Korean War that the last real naval battle of the twentieth century took place, in which cruisers participated. No, of course, and later there were various incidents, for example, in the Gulf of Tonkin or during the Falklands War. However, there is still no complete clarity about what was happening off the coast of Vietnam, and near the Falklands, English ships simply destroyed converted fishing vessels, which can only be attributed to sea battles with colossal stretch. Moreover, both there, and there, the largest ships were destroyers.

We will look at the events of July 2, 1950 off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula from both perspectives. The description is given a special piquancy by the fact that we use recently declassified work under the heading "Only for generals and officers of the USSR Armed Forces." Its content largely explains the intellectual squalor of the Soviet officer corps. The Great Patriotic War definitely did not teach the Soviet leadership anything (remember how Alexander Pokryshkin shot down the Su-2 simply because the profile of the "secret" aircraft was not communicated to ordinary pilots?), And even the secret textbook was stuffed with silence and outright lies. The simplest example is that it does not contain a single word about the participation of Soviet pilots in the Korean War. Well, what can we learn from shameless lies, we have seen more than once.

But air affairs do not concern us, we will only note that by this time the works of Carig and Pardon, Kagle and Mason had already appeared, so it was easy to clarify the composition of the enemy forces, but Soviet authors wrote what they wrote.

Early in the morning, an artillery support group consisting of the American cruiser Juno, the British cruiser Jamaica and the British frigate Black Swan was located near Chumunjin. The allies found a detachment of 4 torpedo and 2 artillery boats of the DPRK and went to intercept. The cruisers opened fire from a distance of 55 cables, soon one torpedo boat was sunk, the second lost its speed, the third washed ashore. Only the fourth boat managed to escape, hiding behind a smoke screen, "Jamaica" picked up 2 prisoners. After that, the cruisers began shelling the North Korean positions near Gangneung.

As described by Korean historians, this first and last naval battle of the Korean War looks different. The DPRK sea hunter division intended to land a small landing in the Chumunchzhin area. An hour before the landing party left the base, a link of torpedo boats under the command of "the courageous commander Li Gong Oka" left the base. A night search yielded no results, but at dawn, two American cruisers and a destroyer appeared on the horizon. By this time, the troops had already landed, and the hunters joined the torpedo boats.

The enemy found the boats, increased the speed and went across the path. However, Kim Gong Ok himself decided to attack the enemy, although he did not have such an order: having discovered the American cruisers and reported it on the radio, he had already completed his task.

4 torpedo boats went on a combat course, the distance was rapidly decreasing. “The Americans opened a strong barrage of fire. Shells burst here and there. Gradually, white pillars of breaks are approaching the daredevils. Here the boats are approaching the zone of continuous enemy barrage. Here they are, maneuvering at maximum speed, breaking through the curtain of fire. The enemy transfers fire, trying to disrupt the attack of the boats. But it's too late, the goal is very close. "

The lead boat of Officer Choi Deng Soo fired a torpedo from a distance of 5 cables, it exploded, seriously damaging the American heavy cruiser. While the American ship maneuvers to dodge the torpedoes, Officer Lee Wan Geun manages to get a second hit on the heavy cruiser, which gets heavily heeled.

However, the shooting of the Americans also gives a result, since the boat of officer Yak Kwan Yi first lights up and then loses speed. After receiving a few more hits, he begins to drown. Then a strong explosion is heard on the boat, and when the smoke dissipates, "restless waves only splashed in this place." By this time, there were also killed and wounded on other boats.

The commander of the battalion of sea hunters Ko Rong Myung ordered his ships to come closer and open fire on the enemy cruisers. Of course, his guns could not cause serious damage to the enemy, but he hoped to divert the attention of the Americans from the torpedo boats.

Kim Gong Ok decided to repeat the attack, as there were still torpedoes on the boats. This time, the first boat was Kim Do Hyun, on which the battalion commander was. He came close to the cruiser and almost crashed into its side, but failed to release a torpedo. Later it turned out that a shell fragment damaged the torpedo tube. The boat fired at the cruiser from a machine gun, and then slipped between the damaged ship and the destroyer. Having set up a smoke screen, he safely exited the battle.

The Americans were at a loss, which Lee Wang Geun took advantage of. He managed to get close to a distance of 3 cables and fired a torpedo, which hit the target. The cruiser shuddered and began to sink in front of the Korean patriots.

For this fight, Kim Gun Ok and Lee Wang Geun received the title of Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

And now the third version of the description of the same battle is the Soviet one. At midnight on July 2, 4 torpedo boats went out to sea to search for and destroy enemy ships, and enemy ships were found in the area east of Chkhumunjin. The enemy detachment consisted of a Baltimore-class heavy cruiser, a Jamaica-class light cruiser, and a destroyer. The boats were against the background of the dark coast, and therefore the enemy did not see them until the very launch of the torpedoes. The surprise ensured the complete success of the attack, three torpedoes hit the heavy cruiser, and one more - the light cruiser. Both ships were damaged, but managed to return to their bases. The enemy's return fire sank two torpedo boats, the third threw ashore.

The attack by the torpedo boats was carried out boldly and decisively and was crowned with complete success. The DPRK sailors demonstrated a high level of combat training and courage, reaching the point of the salvo at a distance of no more than 3 cables. This is confirmed by the high percentage of hits and the fact that all torpedoes that hit exploded.

Well, how did you like these nonsense ?! Moreover, all three stories were written, of course, on the basis of completely reliable official archival documents. True, no one heard anything about the sinking of the cruiser Baltimore, but this is the surest proof that it was destroyed. This means that the Americans have something to hide, since they are silent!

By the way, the next day the Black Swan really almost got into big trouble when it was suddenly attacked by 2 stormtroopers who jumped out from the coast from the evening haze. The frigate did not have time to react or open fire. True, all his damage was limited to a couple of bursts whipping at the superstructures, although it could have ended much worse. By the way, pay attention, Black Swan again!

The cruiser also fired the last shot in this war. This dubious honor belongs to the American heavy cruiser Saint Paul. A ceasefire agreement was already signed on June 27, 1953 at 22.00, but the cruiser fired the last salvo at 21.59.

When the Korean War ended, it was time to draw conclusions, and they were dire for the old artillery ships. With the advent of jet aircraft, the anti-aircraft gun, in principle, could no longer provide reliable air defense of the ship. It's time for rockets. And this is where the fact that the light cruisers did not have the necessary modernization reserve affected, first of all, this applied to small English-built cruisers. None of them was converted into a URO cruiser. Even the relatively larger American Clevelands were ill-equipped for this, as the cost of the costs had to be correlated with the results obtained. It was possible to completely gut the hull and fill it with new weapons, but then it would be cheaper to build a new cruiser from scratch.

However, the Soviet naval commanders did not immediately reach the idea of ​​a missile cruiser. At first, flirting with the projects of heavy cruisers began, fortunately, the never-realized Project 66 appeared - a cruiser with 220-mm guns. And our sea geniuses are starting to seriously consider the prospects of his artillery duel with "Des Moines" at distances of more than 200 cables. This is not even delusion, it is complete and complete schizophrenia. But this is not enough: in 1954, the development of Project 84 begins, in which sailors return to the strange caliber of 180 mm. In addition, the mistake made by the British half a century ago is being repeated - they are trying to turn a heavy weapon into a universal one, giving it an elevation angle of up to 75 degrees. Some dashing historians even suggest that U-2 scouts were going to shoot down from it. In general, the admirals led by Kuznetsov tried to rush into the past at full speed, and only Khrushchev's voluntarism was able to stop them. In general, there is a lot of talk about the voluntarism of amateurs, and mostly bad, but a couple of times it brought great benefit to the navies. Let us recall at least the voluntarism of Sir Vinnie Churchill, from whom the Royal Navy cried bloody (literally) tears more than once. But only an amateur adventurer could start building the battleships Queen Elizabeth, which helped the British win two world wars at sea. The same can be said about Khrushchev's decision to stop building large artillery ships. With this he guessed right, although most often he missed.

It all started with the alteration of old cruisers, the Americans set an example by sending about a dozen ships to the shipyard. As a rule, the aft towers were removed from them and launchers of Terrier and Teilos anti-aircraft missiles were installed. The Soviet fleet followed the same path when the Dzerzhinsky cruiser was rebuilt according to the 70-E project. There is only one, but a very significant difference. If on the American cruiser CAG-1 "Boston" there were two paired launchers "Terrier", in the cellars of each of which were stored 72 missiles, then on the "Dzerzhinsky" twin installation M-2 had ammunition of only 10 missiles. Agree, the difference is more than significant. Attempts to install projectile aircraft on cruisers of this period were clearly experimental in nature, and should not be taken seriously.

But after this, the development paths of Soviet and American missile cruisers diverge sharply, if not in directly opposite directions, then at least in perpendicular ones. There are two completely different classes of ships, only by misunderstanding combined into one, called a missile cruiser. The Americans are starting to build ocean-going escort ships, while the Soviet navy gets surface combat ships, since the term "missile duel" has never caught on. The main enemy of the American cruisers is the Soviet submarines, the main enemy of the Soviet - the American aircraft carriers.

On June 30, 1958, the heavy cruiser SA-123 "Albany" went to the shipyard to be converted into missile cruiser... This was no longer a partial alteration, but a complete rebuilding of the ship, which had lost all of its artillery. In general, only the hull and cars remained from it, but the profile has changed beyond recognition. For the first time, the Americans used massive pipe masts.

Now the cruiser was armed with 2 twin Teylos missile launchers, 2 twin Tartar missile launchers, 2 127 mm guns, and - most importantly! - installation on 8 ASROK anti-submarine missiles and 2 three-tube torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber for anti-submarine torpedoes. The former heavy cruiser has turned into an escort ship, capable of conducting an artillery duel with nothing more than a destroyer. This ship determined the further mainline development of American cruisers.

As we have already noted, the Soviet fleet took a completely different path. In June 1962, the Project 58 Grozny missile destroyer entered service, which also became a landmark ship for the Soviet Navy. When Khrushchev, accompanied by Defense Minister Malinovsky, visited Northern Fleet, the new ship made a great impression on him, he even decided to go on it on a visit to England. But it is inappropriate for the honor of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to ride some kind of destroyer, so all 4 ships were hastily transferred to cruisers, although with a displacement of about 4500 tons it looked strange. Such cruisers had ceased to be built half a century ago, but the weapons of the "Terrible" were much more terrible than the Elsvik cruisers had once had.

The ship had 2 quadruple launchers of P-35 anti-ship missiles, 8 more spare missiles were stored in superstructures, and 2 missiles had nuclear warheads. But for the twin installation of the Volna air defense missile system, there were only 16 missiles - again several times less than on American ships. 2 twin 76-mm mounts supplemented the ship's air defense. Anti-submarine weapons were only short-range - 2 built-in torpedo tubes and 2 twelve-barreled launchers RBU-6000. Although in all the diagrams the ship is depicted with a Ka-25 helicopter at the stern, in fact, the vehicle was based on the shore and was taken only for overload.

This very word "overload" also determined the general approach of Soviet shipbuilders in the near future. For its displacement, the ship was overloaded with weapons to the detriment of seaworthiness; it was not for nothing that experts considered the reloading of the P-35 missile system installations at sea rather dubious. However, the historians Kuzin and Nikolsky found an elegant way to get around this unpleasant definition, their art of verbal casuistry can only be admired. "Since then and up to the present time, foreign experts have not ceased to note that a characteristic handwriting in the design of Russian ships is their extremely high saturation with firing systems and military equipment, combined with excellent design." Class!

This trend continued in the future. Our historians consider Soviet cruisers packed with various weapons to be the height of perfection, but American ones, with their improved seaworthiness and more comfortable living and working conditions for the crew, are deliberately bad. Let's say it carefully: this theory has not been tested in combat conditions. The funny thing is that it was precisely this overload with powerful weapons that the "Grozny" just reminded of the very Elsvik cruisers, from which it all began.

If we consider the changes that took place in naval theory and military shipbuilding somewhere around 1960, then we will be forced to admit that another revolution took place, and a revolution much deeper than all previous ones. You can even say that everything that happened before does not go beyond the usual palace coups. The Carolingian dynasty ruled and ruled itself, which sunk to lazy kings (wooden ships), when suddenly energetic Valois (armored ships) appeared and displaced them. And the kingdom remained as it was. Then suddenly Valois was replaced by the Bourbons (dreadnoughts). And the kingdom remained. The Bourbons were replaced by the energetic Napoleon Bonaparte (read - aircraft carrier). The kingdom was renamed into an empire, but in general everything remained in its place. But atomic bombs and rockets appeared - and the whole monarchy went to hell. Now the Navy faced completely different tasks, the Navy received strategic weapons, and at some point, for the United States, ballistic missiles on submarines became almost the main component of the nuclear triad.

Accordingly, the tasks of surface ships and cruisers, in particular, were revised. And it's not even about nuclear power plants, which dramatically increased the autonomy of formations, the main thing is fundamentally new weapons systems. Of particular interest in this regard is the only American cruiser built during this period - "Long Beach". It was designed as a frigate, but already at the design stage, the ship's displacement jumped to 15,000 tons, and it turned into a real cruiser. The ship received a nuclear power plant and the same armament as the Albany. It would seem that this is surprising, just quite adequate escort ship for the new nuclear aircraft carrier "Enterprise". But at about the same time, the atomic frigate Bainbridge was built, which had half the displacement and was also ideally suited for this role. The fact is that, according to the initial project, it was planned to install Polaris ballistic missiles on Long Beach, turning it into a strategic ship. But this project remained on paper, although the allocated displacement reserve remained. However, for a long time the Americans were running around with projects to install ballistic missiles on various surface ships, the most extravagant was the proposal to turn Iowa-class battleships into ballistic missile monitors, as described in the book Battleships in Battle, recently published by Yauza. But in the end, American admirals left ballistic missiles exclusively to submarines. Similar projects appeared in the Soviet Navy, but they also remained in the subjunctive mood.

So, let's consider the development lines of missile cruisers in the American and Soviet fleets, and it should be said right away that they were not as straightforward as it might seem, primarily due to the continuing confusion with the classification of surface ships.

The Americans were engaged in the massive construction of various escort ships, ranging in size from the destroyer escort "Dili" to the same "Long Beach". But the main ones were considered missile frigates - ships larger than the old destroyer, but smaller than the cruiser. The fact is that for a long time it was not possible to squeeze rocket launchers onto small ships; the Americans succeeded in this only when their destroyer escorts overtook the destroyers of the Second World War in displacement. Likewise, the displacement of rocket frigates grew, especially when they began to massively install nuclear reactors on them. Ships of the types "California" and "Virginia" jumped the mark of 10,000 tons of displacement, and it was somehow indecent to call them frigates as before, therefore, on June 30, 1975, the previous classification was adjusted, and all these ships were transferred in one fell swoop to cruisers. For example, the DLG-16 "Legy" became the CG-16, that is, the missile cruiser. However, the smallest ships of the Farragat class were transferred from DLG escort ships to DDG missile destroyers. This confusion was reflected in the breakdown of the traditional naming system of the American fleet, because until now the names of the states were given only ships of the line, and then suddenly they were glued to the frigates. Well, even if the cruisers ...

A little later, the Americans abandoned nuclear reactors on small ships and turned to gas turbines. In 1980, a new generation missile cruiser CG-47 "Ticonderoga" was laid, on which the "Aegis" system was installed. At the same time, initially, these ships were also supposed to be DDG missile destroyers, but the word "cruiser" sounds so beautiful! After it, a larger series of missile cruisers of the "Port Royal" type was laid - scraps fly from the established system of names, because these ships already receive former aircraft carrier names - battles won by the Americans or considered to be so. But here's the question: how long will this classification system remain, because missile destroyers, say the DDG-87 "Mastin", have already come close to them in terms of displacement. And will there be another crowd of missile cruisers in the American Navy in the near future?

As for the armament, it remained practically unchanged for half a century (!) With minimal changes. Old missiles were replaced with newer and more advanced ones, new fire control systems appeared - and that was all. The only fundamental innovation was the installation on almost all large ships of the American fleet, including missile cruisers, of course, Harpoon cruise missiles, which can also carry a nuclear warhead. Cruisers are again returning to the category of strategic ships, although the range of the Harpoon, of course, cannot be compared with the range of the Polaris, and even more so the Trident. Well, the installation of a pair of Vulcan-Falanx anti-aircraft guns to protect against cruise missiles can be overlooked. After all, who counted the additional erlikons delivered to cruisers during World War II?

But the long and glorious history of British cruisers ended. In 1979, the helicopter-carrying cruiser Blake was withdrawn from the fleet, and the Royal Navy never received a single cruiser-class ship again. Even rather large missile destroyers of the Devonshire and Bristol types, which could well be considered cruisers, remained destroyers. The unfortunate Admiralty was forced to resort to such tricks in order to snatch the money necessary for the development of the fleet. As one of the historians correctly noted, as soon as the British Empire collapsed, its support - the British cruiser - disappeared.

The same thing happened in other fleets. Gone are the French and Italian cruisers, Japan did not build them anymore, at least officially, although the displacement of the Chokai-class missile destroyers exceeded 7000 tons, which is quite decent for a modern cruiser. In a word, cruisers as a class (this is not a Marxist formulation) remained only in the Soviet and American fleets, and the history of the Soviet missile cruiser turned out to be even more confusing.

Let's return to our native land. It is difficult to understand further zigzags of Soviet naval thought. I involuntarily return to the phrase I heard twice from our admirals: the Soviet fleet received the ships that Boris Butoma wanted and could build, and not those that Admiral Gorshkov wanted to receive. But I can neither confirm nor deny this statement. If I turn to them, they will backtrack on their words even today... Or especially today.

It was planned to build 16 ships of the "Grozny" type, but everything ended with four units. Development of a ship with more powerful defensive weapons begins, and Project 1134 "Admiral Zozulya" appears. Although the P-35 installations on it remain, their number is reduced - there are only two paired ones, but the number of missile launchers doubles, their ammunition increases. Again, anti-submarine torpedo tubes remain, but now they are becoming five-pipe, RBU-6000 installations and new RBU-1000. And most importantly, the ship was originally classified as a BLK - a large anti-submarine ship, which met the requirements of the moment. A new threat appeared on the horizon - American submarines armed with Polaris missiles, and it was necessary to create a means of dealing with them. However, no one wanted to ponder: would the Americans, who unconditionally dominate the sea, allow the hunt for their submarines? NATO aircraft will hand over these "hunters" like a fox to chickens. Or is there still the same bet on a preventive unprovoked attack? Say, we will drown the boats, and there at least the grass will not grow. In any case, the tracking of American aircraft carriers by our artillery cruisers proceeded precisely from this. But then it turns out that the naval doctrine of the USSR did not leave a stone unturned from the "statements of the party and government about the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union." But at the same time, the fleet was announced in advance as one giant kamikaze, because our ships did not even have a shadow of a chance to survive after such an attack. They were doomed.

Along the way, they began to make changes to the project, large anti-submarine ships 1134A, 1134B appeared. Gas turbines appear on ships as engines. By the way, abroad these ships were not called other than cruisers. For this reason, or because the Soviet admirals were hooked on how the Americans, with a simple stroke of the pen, so dramatically increased the combat power of their fleet, and they wanted the same thing, but in the summer of 1977, the ships of Project 1134 were transferred to fear of enemies into missile cruisers. By the way, Admiral Gorshkov, apparently realizing the pointlessness of building such ships, suggested re-equipping them with P-500 Basalt anti-ship missiles. The proposal did not pass, although it gave impetus to the creation of the next series of missile cruisers.

In the mid-1970s, work began on the cruisers of Project 1164, apparently, American aircraft carriers were again designated as the main enemy. Missile system The P-500 gave Soviet ships at least a theoretical chance of surviving a strike on an aircraft carrier task force. After all, this is not an artillery cruiser that was forced to follow within line of sight of an enemy aircraft carrier. True, it is not very clear why 130-mm guns appear on ships. As the last line of air defense, this caliber is redundant, and in all other respects insufficient. For example, the Falklands War showed that modern automatic weapons as a means of support for the landing are clearly inferior to the old 152-mm, and better 203-mm guns.

By the way, it is curious that also in the mid-1970s, the Americans began to develop the nuclear attack cruiser CSGN, but they intend to install a new 203-mm MCLWG gun on it. The design of the 155-mm AGS gun begins, and the LRLAP active-rocket projectiles with an insane firing range are being created. But how do you imagine aiming a gun on a target at a distance of 67 miles ?! This shows that even practical Americans were sometimes brought into the wrong steppe, the main thing is that they managed to stop in time.

The cruisers 1164 carry 16 launchers, which gives them a fairly powerful salvo, but at the same time there is no constructive protection at all, which further emphasizes their fate of "ships of one salvo".

And after that, our shipbuilding makes a leap forward, ships of Project 1144 appear. It is interesting that the assignment was issued for a large nuclear anti-submarine ship, a project for an atomic anti-submarine cruiser was signed, and a heavy nuclear missile cruiser entered service.

Alas, here there was a relapse of the disease that plagued the French fleet at the end of the 19th century, when five battleships of six different types were being built. Among the four cruisers of the 1144 project, no two were alike, even purely formally "Admiral Ushakov" had an index of 1144, "Admiral Lazarev", "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Peter the Great" - 1144.2, but the last trinity differed from each other in the composition of weapons and BIUS ... The reason was prosaic - the factories did not have time to prepare the designed systems, so they put what was at hand at the moment. Temporary, of course, but there is nothing more permanent than temporary. On these ships, some kind of booking appears again, and for some unknown reason, our historians admire the allegedly original scheme of local protection. But excuse me, what was the “box protection” of the Washington cruisers, who were repeatedly so impressed? Or have we, as has happened more than once, “the party invented the bicycle”?

The Soviet fleet received powerful ships with a completely incomprehensible purpose. They would have looked great as part of American aircraft carrier formations, but in the Soviet navy ... It turned out to be a huge escort ship, armed in addition with the Granit SCRC, by the way, for the first time, Soviet ships caught up with American missiles in terms of ammunition. It can be assumed that the cruisers of Project 1144 were a new reincarnation of the idea of ​​Project 1164 with increased combat resistance. The only question is, have they really been promoted? The fact is that the well-known reference book "Jane" glued these ships an insulting label "blind pithecanthropus with an atomic club", hinting at extreme imperfection electronic systems... But, like many others, this assessment of the ship's qualities remains purely speculative, not verified by experience (fortunately, not verified).

By the way, modern Russian experts have an ambiguous assessment of this project. Some people believe that in the guise of "Peter the Great" Stalin's dream of a "bandit cruiser" came true, which pushed through the Soviet military-industrial complex, which built a ship that was completely unnecessary for the fleet. Maybe that's why the idea arose to "cut" the ship of project 1144 in half and get a missile cruiser of project 1293 and anti-submarine ship of project 1199.

Crying was regularly heard in the Soviet fleet that our ships had nothing to work on coastal targets. "It was painful, bitter and insulting to watch how American battleships were processing the Vietnamese coast with their 406-mm guns with almost impunity." Apparently, our admirals also wanted to process something. Only one question: what exactly? What landings and where was the Soviet fleet going to land? Was it possible that our naval commanders were going to reach the American coast on the BDB and land somewhere in the San Francisco area? After all, the Soviet fleet had nothing like ocean-going landing ships of the Iwo Jima, Tarva, and Wasp types. Only now are we going to buy it, and even then we have to buy it in France.

The Soviet Navy had some other cruisers, which are simply inappropriate to talk about. For unknown reasons, all Soviet aircraft carriers were initially listed as aircraft carrying cruisers. There were grounds for this, because the same project 1143 was for some reason armed with the Basalt SCRC and a set of anti-submarine systems, quite suitable for any submarine submarine system. The impression was that a Project 1134 BOD was glued to a small aircraft carrier like Illastries from the side at an angle. But the result was “not a mouse, not a frog, but an unknown animal”, which did not meet the requirements of either one or this ship. Even the real aircraft carriers of Project 11435 somehow fell into this strange class of ships. But the hard fate of the only completed ship of this class, it seems to me, was determined by something else. "Riga" - "Leonid Brezhnev" - "Tbilisi" - "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" ... Renaming a ship once is already unfortunately, but here there are four different names. Definitely not good.

Little of! You know that in those distant times, our submarines with ballistic missiles were listed in the fleet as SSBNs - strategic missile submarines. These are the pies with cruise ... that is, with kittens it turns out.

This could be the end of the description of the history of the cruiser class, but it seems to me that it will continue further. Modern systems weapons are becoming more and more cumbersome and heavy, respectively, the displacement of ships is growing. New American frigates have already approached the critical point of 10,000 tons, so it is likely that another classification change, and the number of cruisers will jump again. And so on ad infinitum, as long as there are military fleets, and it would be an absolute stupidity to abolish them so far, there is no need to talk about a big war today, but the fight against pirates in the 21st century has become urgent again. The Royal Navy is again forced to revive the seemingly gone forever auxiliary cruisers. Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited is using the navy to equip nuclear fuel transports with automatic cannons to prevent them from being captured by pirates. In Russia, the option of arming transports with disguised launchers of ZM-54 missiles is being considered with the aim of the same surprise strike on enemy aircraft carriers, it turns out that a natural HSK-8 "Cormoran" is obtained. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to guess what awaits us in the future. It is only clear that the history of cruisers will certainly continue.

Continuation of issue # 17. The role that the heavy cruisers of the US Navy played in World War II is enormous. The importance of heavy cruisers in the Pacific increased especially after the Japanese carrier-based aviation neutralized virtually all the American battleships of the Pacific Fleet on December 7. Not a single heavy cruiser was harmed in that historic raid. All heavy cruisers took part in battles against the samurai-Japanese and German-fascist aggressors.

The role that the heavy cruisers of the US Navy played in World War II is enormous. The importance of heavy cruisers in the Pacific increased especially after the Japanese carrier-based aviation neutralized virtually all the American battleships of the Pacific Fleet on December 7. Not a single heavy cruiser was harmed in that historic raid. All heavy cruisers took part in battles against the samurai-Japanese and German-fascist aggressors.

As you know, the first cruisers were equipped with both steam engines and sails to increase the cruising range. The development of cruisers followed the same main path as the development of ships of other classes - armor, rifled guns appeared on cruisers, sails disappeared (later on large ships). By the end of the 19th century, large cruisers were divided into armored and armored decks. The former armored the hull sides and deck, the latter only the deck.

The first armored cruisers of the US Navy became "Atlanta" and "Boston", built in the 80s of the XIX century. Atlanta was scrapped in 1912, and Boston, renamed Dispatch, ended its service in 1946.

The armament and displacement of light and heavy cruisers were limited by the Washington and London treaties concluded after the end of the First World War. Then all cruisers were divided into two categories - light and heavy (instead of cruisers of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd classes, battle, armored, armored). The displacement of light cruisers was limited to 10,000 tons (9,072 metric tons), armament - 152-mm guns. For heavy cruisers, the same displacement limit was set as for light ones, but they were allowed to have artillery of 203 mm caliber, but not larger. The cruisers, built taking into account the restrictions established by the Washington Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Arms, began to be called "Washington". The first Washington-based cruiser built in the United States was Pensacola. Displacement "Pensacol" did not reach the upper limit of the limits of almost 1,000 tons, the booking of these ships was insufficient.

The last American Washington cruisers were the Wichita-class ships. With the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, the limits of international treaties ceased to limit the flight of imagination of customers and the sharpness of thought of designers. The United States immediately set about designing large and very well-armed heavy cruisers and battleships. The cruisers of the Baltimore / Oregon City and Alaska class were built without regard to the Washington and London treaties.

The main caliber of the Wichita and Baltimore cruisers consisted of 8-inch (203 mm) 55-caliber guns with a barrel of 118 kg, firing shells weighing 118 kg at a distance of 29 km. The Alaska-class cruisers were armed with 12-inch guns with a 50-caliber long barrel, which sent projectiles weighing 517 kg at a distance of 33.5 km. The average caliber of the Wichita-class cruisers consisted of 5-inch guns with a long barrel of 38 calibers. On the Baltimore and Alaska-class cruisers, two-gun turrets with 5-inch guns with a barrel length of 38 calibers were installed. These versatile weapons were intended mainly to repel air attacks, the firing range at an elevation angle of 85 degrees was 11 km; the maximum firing range at ground and surface targets is 16 km, with an elevation angle of the trunks of 45 degrees. The near air defense zone of the cruisers was blocked by fire from 20-mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns and 40-mm Bofors automatic cannons. Oerlikons and Bofors were built in the United States under licenses purchased from Switzerland and Sweden, respectively. Originally, the Wichita-class cruisers were armed with quad 28mm automatic cannons known as the Chicago Harmoniums. They were also planned to be installed on the Baltimore. These guns were distinguished by their structural complexity, and in operation they proved to be an unreliable system. The Harmoniums did not last long on the decks of the ships of the American fleet. The Wichita-class cruisers also carried 12.7-mm Browning M2 machine guns with water-cooled barrels to repel air attacks. Machine guns were completely unsuitable for repelling air attacks in naval combat. Machine guns and 28mm cannons were replaced by Oerlikons and Bofors.

Beginning in 1939, heavy cruisers began to receive a variety of radar and electronic equipment. The first CXAM airspace surveillance radar was received by the cruiser "Chicago" (CA-29). In the course of the war, the composition of the radio-electronic equipment of heavy cruisers was repeatedly updated. Typically, cruisers carried two SG water surveillance radars and one SK airspace surveillance radar. Interestingly, radars were then considered extremely secret devices, which is why most of the sailors from the cruiser teams did not even suspect why strange structures called "antennas" were mounted on the masts of their ships. In 1944, the cruisers received "friend or foe" equipment designed for aircraft identification. In 1945, on some cruisers such as Baltimore and Oregon City, improved SK-2 and SG-2 radars appeared, which had an increased target detection range.

127 mm turret cannon

The First World War was the first in which camouflage and camouflage painting of ships was widely used. The camouflage was intended to make it difficult to determine the class of the ship, its course, speed and range from the observer. Great attention was paid to the camouflage of ships then by the British, and to a lesser extent by the Americans. Both the British and the Americans focused their efforts on developing camouflage and camouflage paint schemes for relatively small ships (before the destroyer) and transports, the main threat to which was German submarines. In the interwar period, camouflage was almost forgotten. Most of the US Navy ships during this period sailed in light or dark gray. The outbreak of World War II piqued interest in the camouflage of ships. In 1942, the cruiser "Wichita" was painted according to the Measure 12 - Sea Blue / Ocean Gray scheme. The first Baltimore-class cruisers entered service in their original Measure 21 color scheme - fully painted in NAVY Blue. This color did not mask the ships from aerial observation, therefore the Measure 22 scheme was developed - the "gradation" scheme NAVY Blue / Haze Gray. The Measure 21 scheme was used more often in the Pacific Ocean, and the Measure 22 scheme was used in the Atlantic. Some cruisers received camouflage paint from spot-stripes. different color, distorting the shape and size of the ship.

The heavy cruisers had two catapults each. designed for launching seaplanes, one or two cranes for loading airplanes. Several types of seaplanes were based on cruisers throughout their careers - Curtis SOC / SON Seagal, Vout OS2U / OS2N Kingfisher, Curtis SC – I Seahock. At the beginning of the war, the Sigalls prevailed, in the middle - the Kingfishers, at the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945, the Sihoki appeared. The aircraft were used for correcting fire with the main caliber, search and rescue, delivery of people and small cargo.

Heavy cruisers of the US Navy were named after cities in the United States, with one exception - the cruiser Canberra (CA-70) was named in memory of the Australian cruiser Canberra (not in honor of the capital of Australia!). The cruiser Canberra died along with the cruisers Astoria, Vincennes and Quincy in the battle at Savo Island on the night of August 9, 1942. The tradition of naming ships but the names of large cities has been preserved in the American navy to this day - in honor of nuclear attack submarines are named.

For successes in battles, the Navy ships received a special insignia - battle stars, Battle Stars. The stars were attached to the flag of the ship. The cruiser "Wichita" received 13 battle stars for her participation in the battles in the Pacific and Atlantic. Of the late American heavy cruisers, the most honored was St. Paul (SA-73) - 17 battle stars for the battles of World War II, the Korean War and Vietnam.

Heavy cruisers of the "Stalingrad" class

The construction of the project 82 heavy cruisers, envisaged for delivery by the ten-year plan of military shipbuilding for 1946-1955, was originally planned to be carried out at factories No. 402 in Molotovsk and No. 444 in Nikolaev, two ships on each. In addition, it was planned to additionally lay one in 1953 and two more cruisers in 1955. The new ships were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War and progress in the development of naval weapons and equipment.

The history of designing heavy cruisers of Project 82 began even before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and turned out to be very difficult and dramatic. To a large extent, this was the result of increased attention and significant influence in the development and adoption of decisions on the main issues of their creation on the part of I.V. Stalin, who at that time was the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR. In the first book of memoirs by N.G. Kuznetsov “On the Eve” it was noted that I.V. Stalin had a special, difficult to explain addiction to heavy cruisers.

After the signing in August - September 1939 of the Soviet-German treaties on non-aggression, friendship and the border, as well as a trade and credit agreement, from October of the same year, negotiations between delegations of representatives of the USSR and Germany took place, culminating in the conclusion of an economic agreement in February 1940, which provided for the supply to the USSR, in exchange for raw materials, a wide range of mechanical engineering products, including weapons and military equipment. In connection with the reorientation, with the outbreak of World War II, of the German shipbuilding industry towards the large-scale construction of submarines (due to the curtailment of the surface military shipbuilding program), there has been a possibility of acquiring several warships suspended there.

Therefore, when the first Soviet trade and procurement commission headed by the People's Commissar of the USSR shipbuilding industry I.T. Tevosyan, the specialists of the NKSP and the Navy, included in its composition, were instructed to familiarize themselves with and negotiate the acquisition of two or three heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with 203-mm artillery, which had been serially built since 1935 (at that time, two ships of this type had already been transferred the German fleet, and three were completed afloat). This would make it possible to replenish our fleet at an accelerated pace with valuable combat units, without reducing the number of ships under construction and scheduled for construction.

As a result of negotiations, the German side agreed to sell to the USSR only one unfinished, the last in the series, the cruiser Lyuttsov, which had a technical readiness of about 50%. Bremen and its main contractors) for the period of completion of the ship. At the end of May 1940, in accordance with the concluded economic agreement, "Luttsov" (from September of the same year - "Petropavlovsk") arrived in tug in Leningrad and was delivered at the outfitting wall of the plant No. 189.

Model of a heavy cruiser project 82, manufactured in accordance with 073 1947.

Its acquisition (as well as the leader of the Italian-built destroyers "Tashkent") made it possible for our specialists to get acquainted with the latest foreign military equipment, take into account overseas experience and to introduce a number of advanced technical solutions at that time when creating new Russian-built naval ships. In addition, this partially resolved the issue of rational use of the available (before the launching of large ships on the stocks) at the leading Leningrad shipbuilding enterprises of the reserve of workers of outfitting specialties. If the German side fulfilled its obligations, the ship could be transferred to the Navy in 1942.

Heavy cruisers of the "Admiral Hipper" type had more powerful, in comparison with the light cruisers of Project 68 (of the "Chapaev" type) being built at that time for our fleet, artillery armament, an inclined side armor belt with an armor thickness of 80 mm (equivalent to a 100-mm vertical armor), stabilization of 105-mm universal gun mounts. They practically solved a number of urgent and complex problems of military shipbuilding, which Soviet specialists were working on at that time: the introduction of welded structures of the hull and superstructures, the use of steam of high parameters (63 atm, 450 ° C), automatic regulation of the main elements of the power plant, an increase in the cruising range for due to the higher efficiency of the power plant, the use of roll stabilizers, a high degree of saturation of the ship with DC and AC electrical equipment.

For the technological study of the working design documentation (RCD) coming from Germany for the cruiser "Lyuttsov" (project 83), a special "Bureau L" was organized in the building of the outfitting shop of plant No. 189. The translation of this RKD into Russian, its re-release according to the normative documentation in force in the USSR and the solution with the help of German specialists of the design issues arising during the completion of the ship were entrusted to TsKB-17, as a developer of cruiser projects.

After the acquisition of "Lyuttsov" and a thorough study of the design documentation on it, the question arose about the advisability of creating on this basis more advanced ships of the same subclass, armed with 203-mm artillery, which would be further development a number of innovative solutions of the project 83. At the direction of N.G. Kuznetsov, the General Staff Department prepared a preliminary OTZ for the design of such a ship (project 82) with the same composition of the main artillery, which was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in mid-May 1941. In accordance with this OTZ, the purpose of the ship was determined by the solution of the following main tasks: the battle with heavy cruisers armed with 203-mm artillery, the destruction of enemy light cruisers, support for the actions of their light cruisers, the setting of active minefields, the suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for the landing of assault forces, actions on enemy communications.

On the basis of the approved assignment, the Design Bureau of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) of the Navy worked out three options for the main fuel and energy elements of the ship: for OTZ GMSH with a displacement of about 25,000 tons; with reduced requirements for booking and travel speed - about 18,000 tons, according to the proposals of the design bureau of NTK - about 20,000 tons the purpose of the ship and it was proposed to accept 220-mm artillery as the main caliber for it (which would ensure the superiority of this cruiser over all existing cruisers with 203-mm artillery), increase the number of 100-mm ZKDB guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft machine guns, install instead of machine guns 20 mm assault rifles, reduce the number of aircraft, reduce armor thickness, travel speed and cruising range. The clarification of the requirements of the preliminary OTZ was delayed due to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War.

Taking into account the experience of combat operations at sea during the Second World War and the proposals of the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1943-1945, the OTZ for the design of the heavy cruiser of Project 82 was repeatedly changed with the clarification of the main tasks of the ship, the composition of its weapons, armor, displacement, speed and cruising range.

In the second edition of the OTZ, approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in September 1943, the purpose of the cruiser was determined by the solution of the following tasks: giving stability to the actions of light forces in the squadron and during independent operations, actions on enemy communications, ensuring the combat activities of aircraft carriers and joint actions with them as the main a large artillery ship, suppressing medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the army's coastal flank and supporting the landing.

In this version of the OTZ, the main caliber was increased to 220 mm, and in addition to the ZKDB (100-mm), a universal (130-mm) was also envisaged, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns significantly increased, and increased seaworthiness requirements were contained (the use of weapons in sea waves up to nine points). With such an increase in armament, the displacement was limited to 20,000-22,000 tons.

According to the 1943 OTZ, TsKB-17, by the end of May next year, worked out eight variants of the main TTE of the Project 82 ship. These studies showed the incompatibility of a number of task requirements (in terms of the composition of weapons, the volume of armor, displacement and speed).

In the third edition of OTZ, approved by N.G. Kuznetsov in November 1944, the designation of the cruiser and the main caliber of the artillery were retained according to its second revision, the universal caliber was enhanced by eliminating the ZKDB, the caliber of small-air artillery (MZA) was increased to 45 mm and, in addition to it, a second caliber was envisaged - 23 mm, decreased requirements for unsinkability and speed. With these changes, the displacement of the MRT was limited to 25,000-26,000 tons. In September 1945, the size of the second caliber MZA was clarified, which was changed to 25 mm.

At the end of 1946, TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 submitted to the UK Navy the results of the development of four options for the main elements of Project 82 for the 1944 OTZ. They were considered on January 13, 1947 by a commission led by Admiral I.S. Yumashev. At this meeting, to the question of the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Admiral V.F. Tributsa - "what is the outdated project 69?" - Reporting on the results of the study, the head of the design bureau TsNIIVKa L.A. Gordon replied: "Insufficient artillery anti-aircraft weapons, lack of radar weapons and unsatisfactory unsinkability (mainly due to the lack of bottom protection)." In his conclusion, after discussing the elaborations, Yumashev noted that "for such a large ship with relatively strong protection, the main artillery caliber of 220 mm is certainly small."

By the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 17, 1947 N.G. Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In his place was appointed Admiral I.S. Yumashev, before the commander of the Pacific Fleet. Therefore, further consideration of the design issues of the project 82 heavy cruiser and the adoption of decisions on them took place without Kuznetsov.

At the end of January 1947, the issues of creating cruisers for the USSR Navy were considered at a special meeting on military shipbuilding in the Kremlin with the participation of I.V. Stalin, where he expressed a desire to have 305-mm artillery of the Main Committee on them. Following the meeting, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, 1947, the ministries of the Armed Forces (MVS) and the shipbuilding industry (SME) were instructed to work out a number of options for Project 82 with 305-mm and 220-mm artillery of the Civil Code and submit them for consideration to the government within two months.

In pursuance of this order, in early February of the same year, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Yumashev, approved the OTZ to work out these options. The assignment for the development of options for Project 82 with a 305-mm main battery was determined by the solution of tasks: giving combat stability light forces acting as part of maneuverable formations; destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203-mm and 152-mm artillery in a naval battle; delivering powerful artillery strikes against especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coastlines (both in independent operations and in interaction with the coastal flank of their troops and the landing of assault forces).

When developing these options, it was necessary to consider various compositions of artillery of the main caliber (8-12 305-mm guns in two- or three-gun turrets) and universal (130-mm or 152-mm guns in two-gun turrets), with the same composition of MZA (45 -mm and 25-mm assault rifles). In terms of aviation armament, it was required to consider two options: the first with four ejection fighter-reconnaissance-spotters (with storage of two of them in the hangar) and two rotary catapults, the second - without basing aircraft on the ship. Full speed was set at least 32 knots (option - 33 knots), cruising range - 6000 miles with economic speed of 18 knots, ensuring the use of weapons in a sea state of 7-8 points.

The OTZ requirements for the development of variants of the 82 project with 220-mm artillery differed from the 1944 assignment. The main caliber ammunition was reduced from 170 to 125 rounds per barrel, the number of 130-mm universal (long-range anti-aircraft) guns - from sixteen to twelve, the 45-mm machine gun ammunition from 1500 to 1000 rounds per barrel. The number of 25-mm machine guns increased from twenty to thirty-two, and their ammunition was reduced from 3000 to 2500 rounds per barrel.

In the middle of the same month, by order of the SME, L.V. was appointed acting chief designer of project 82. Dikovich (before that - the head of the corps department of TsKB-17, who had extensive experience working on light cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and 68, heavy cruisers of project 69 and battleships of project 23, head of design studies for project 82).

Accordingly, OTZ KB TsNIIVK developed and in March 1947 submitted to the UK Navy eight variants of the ship with a displacement of 25,300 to 47,800 tons, and TsKB-17 in April of the same year presented 14 ship variants with a displacement in the same limits. Based on the results of their development, TsNIIVK prepared a TTZ project for the design of a heavy cruiser.

At the same time, in support of the studies of TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 on the instructions of the Artillery Directorate of the Navy, TsKB-34 of the Ministry of Armaments resumed work on the creation of a 305-mm naval turret artillery installation, interrupted with the outbreak of World War II.

According to the technical design of the MK-15 turret with the swinging part of the B-50 for project 69, with a barrel length of 54 caliber, they could provide an initial projectile speed of 900 m / s and a firing range of 257 kbt. On the new 305-mm installations, it was supposed to introduce the achievements of technical progress of that time: remote control aiming towers and barrels and radar fire control, increase fire safety and survivability, reduce by 25 people (about 30%) the number of personnel serving the installation.

At the end of March 1947, Deputy Minister of Armaments V.M. Ryabikov reported to the Navy the results of new studies on two- and three-gun turret guns with long-barreled (61 caliber) 305-mm high-ballistic guns with an initial projectile speed of 950 m / s and a maximum firing range of up to 290 kbt.

Out of the options for project 82 worked out on the OTZ of the Navy in August 1947, the ministers of the Armed Forces, the shipbuilding industry and weapons (respectively N.A.Bulganin, A.A.Goreglyad and D.F. Ustinov) presented three options for consideration by the government: -mm and one with 220-mm main battery artillery.

In their report to Stalin, it was noted that the presentation of the first two variants of the ship (with the same armament and different thickness of the armor of the main side belt) is explained by the difference in the positions of the MVS and SME in terms of the optimal thickness of armor.

The MVS recommended for approval for further design option I with 200 mm armor thickness, which protects the main vital parts of the Project 82 ship from 203-mm enemy shells from a distance of 70 kbt and a greater degree of freedom of maneuvering in battle, which was its important tactical advantage. The ICP proposed to adopt option II with a corresponding decrease in displacement and an increase in full speed, since the 305-mm artillery of the main caliber allows the Project 82 ship to successfully fight against heavy enemy cruisers with 203-mm artillery at long distances, and is provided by a 150-mm armored belt protection of the ship from such projectiles from a distance of 85 kbt is sufficient.

Option III (a cruiser with 220-mm artillery) was seriously inferior to options I and II in terms of fire power and combat survivability. Its advantages over them were only a higher (by 1.5 knots) full speed and a lower (by 25%) displacement. Such a ship could quite successfully fight cruisers with 203-mm artillery. However, a ship with 305-mm artillery was capable of not only destroying well-known enemy cruisers, but also successfully fighting stronger ships, the appearance of which in foreign fleets was not ruled out at that time. Such an advantage in terms of fire power and freedom of maneuvering in battle justified an increase in displacement by 10,000 tons and a loss of 1.5 knots of speed.

1 - steering and tiller compartments; 2-smoke equipment; 3 - room for the mechanisms of the mooring pins; 4 - team premises; 5 - club; 6 - power plant No. 4; 7 - 305-mm three-gun turret mount SM-31; 8 - wardroom of warrant officers and chief officers; 9 - quadruple 45-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun SM-20-ZIF; 10 - cellar of 45 mm ammunition; 11 - reserve command post; 12 - AP radar "Foot-B"; 13 - AP radar "Zalp"; 14 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 15 - operational control room; 16 - wheelhouse and cruising cabin of the flagship; 17 - stabilized guidance post SPN-500-82; 18 - branch of auxiliary boilers; 19 - quadruple 25 mm AU BL-120; 20 - officers' shower room; 21 - navigator's house and aggregate radars "Neptune" and "Nord"; 22 - AP radar "Foot-N"; 23 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 24 - KDP SM-28; 25 - air defense post; 26 - AP radar "Neptune"; 27 - submarine observation posts; 28 - main command post; 29 - combat information post; 30 - flagship salon; 31 - 130-mm two-gun AU BL-109A; 32 - ship commander's office; 33 - mechanical workshop; 34 - room for anchor and mooring capstan mechanisms; 35 - trim compartment; 36 - chain box; 37 - hydroacoustic station "Hercules"; 38 - provision pantries; 39 - baffle of the drainage pump; 40 - room for refrigerated vehicles; 41 - room for diesel generators; 42 - power plant No. 1.43 - 305-mm shells cellar; 44 - cellar of 305-mm charges; 45 - 130-mm ammunition cellar; 46 - bow central artillery post; 47 - receiving radio center; 48 - post of energy and survivability (PEZH); 49 - officers' wardroom; 50 - room for turbine generators and power station No. 2; 51 - gyropost; 52 - central navigator post; 53 - boiler room; 54 - engine room; 55 - operating room; 56 - room for turbine generators and power plant No. 3; 57 - baffle of the evaporation plant; 58 - team bath; 59 - corridor of electric wires; 60 - empty compartments; 61 - systems corridor; 62 - drinking water tank; 63 - washing water tank; 64 - spare power and survivability post; 65 - small arms ammunition cellar; 66 - training ammunition cellar; 67 - ship workshops. A - longitudinal section; B - I platform; В - II platform

At the next consideration by the government of issues on the heavy cruiser of Project 82, which took place only in March 1948, Stalin approved for further design the variant recommended by the MFM with 305-mm artillery, 200-mm main armor belt, a standard displacement of 40,000 tons and a full speed of 32 knots He gave instructions to accelerate the creation of such cruisers and subsequently systematically personally supervised the progress of their design and construction. After choosing a variant of the ship, the draft TTZ for its development, prepared in 1947, was revised by the Navy and agreed with the SME, and then, in April 1948, with a draft government decree on its approval, it was submitted to the Council of Ministers. By the decree of August 31 of the same year on the design and construction of the lead heavy cruiser of project 82, this TTZ was approved. The position of the chief designer of this project was approved by L.V. Dikovich.

The preliminary design of TsKB-17 was developed from the end of 1947 and submitted to the Navy and SMEs in March 1949 in four versions, differing in the placement of the UK and MZA artillery, as well as the composition (in terms of the number and steam output of the main boilers) and the location of the power plant.

The L-3-6 variant had a rhombic arrangement of 130-mm BL-110 units, 12 boilers for 80 t / h in four KOs, and two MOs. In the B-3-8 version, the UK installations were located four on each side, and 12 boilers of the same steam capacity were located in six KOs. Option L-2-4 had a rhombic arrangement of BL-110, four MKO (two boilers for 130 t / h and one GTZA in each). In the L-2-6 version (which the bureau and the customer recommended for technical design), the placement of universal caliber artillery and the power plant was similar to the L-3-6 version, but each of the KO had two main boilers (instead of three) for 130 t / h.

Chief Designer of Project 82 heavy cruiser L.V. Dikovich

Taking into account the tight deadlines for the creation of heavy cruisers of Project 82 (the technical project had to be completed at the end of 1949 to ensure the start of construction of two ships in the 3rd quarter of next year), TsKB-17 began technical design in April 1949. However, in the fall, when the Kremlin was considering the results of the development of the submitted Navy and SME for approval of the draft design, I.V. Stalin unexpectedly asked the chief designer Dikovich a question: "Is it possible to increase the speed of the ship so that our heavy cruiser could catch up and destroy the enemy's ship, which is less powerful in armament and protection, and promptly get away from any more powerful ship?"

This wish of the "leader of the peoples" was taken as an indication to change the TTZ, approved by the government just a year ago. As a result, the preliminary design developed by TsKB-17 was not approved, and in the protocol of its consideration it was noted that the ship had too large a displacement and insufficient speed.

Heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", design view

After this meeting, the bureau proceeded to accelerate the development of the preliminary phase of the technical design (with the selection of new main dimensions and revision of the general arrangement drawings), which was completed in December 1949. Ensuring a full speed of 35 knots required an increase in the power of the power plant by almost 30% (with the installation of an additional number of main boilers and the development of new GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp). To solve the large-scale task of creating a new, unique in terms of power, power plant, the teams of the SKB Boiler Building (head and chief designer GA. Hasanov), design bureaus of the Kharkov turbine generator were involved. Nevsky machine-building and Kirovsky plants. To compensate for the increase in the mass of the power plant and a given reduction in the ship's displacement, it was necessary to reduce the number of 130-mm and 45-mm gun mounts, and also to develop and implement a number of other measures.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", view of the rudder group

Due to the large overload of TsKB-17 (where, simultaneously with the development of Project 82, a significant amount of work was carried out to complete tests of five light cruisers of Project 68K and to deploy large-scale construction of new light cruisers of Project 68-bis), in October of the same year, it was decided to transfer works on project 82 in the newly created TsKB-16 (head - N.N. Isanin), for which it became the main order. In order to ensure continuity design work and the timely release of design documentation for construction plants, about half of the employees of TsKB-17 were transferred to the new bureau since February 1950 - all those involved in work on project 82.

In January 1950, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.A. Malyshev. From the fragments of his diary published in 1997 in the Istochnik magazine it is known that at the beginning of March 1950 in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin, a meeting was held on project 82 with the participation of Malyshev, Yumashev and the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy P.S. Abankina. Stalin asked the sailors for what purposes they were thinking of using such a cruiser. After answering: "to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers" - he objected that "we have nothing to get involved in a battle with the enemy's heavy ships. The main task of a heavy cruiser should be different - the fight against enemy light cruisers. It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it would panic at the enemy's light cruisers, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser must fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit. He must be able to escape from the impact of heavy enemy ships. "

Then Stalin proposed a number of measures to reduce the cruiser's displacement. When the sailors began to object to some of them, he made a number of comments on the composition of universal and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as on the ammunition of artillery of all calibers, noting that it was foolish to put 130-mm anti-aircraft guns on the cruiser with a ceiling of 16 km - the enemy would bomb it from heights from 500 to 1500 m, therefore, an MZA is needed. At the same time, Stalin also ordered to reduce the number of MZA provided for by the project - "such a ship will always have a guard that should protect it."

To the sailors' objections to the reduction of ammunition (referring to the large number of shells on US and British naval ships), Stalin replied: “You do not blindly copy the Americans and the British, they have different conditions, their ships go far into the ocean, breaking away from their bases. We do not intend to conduct ocean battles, but we will fight near our shores and we do not need to have a large ammunition reserve on the ship. " In this regard, he also allowed to reduce the cruising range and noted that “it is impossible to create a ship that would have all the advantages. You can have advantages either in speed, or in armor and weapons. "

Then Stalin asked where it was planned to build the lead cruiser. When he received the answer that he was in Leningrad, he said that first of all he would like to have two heavy cruisers on the Black Sea, “where you need to have a large fleet, ten times more than now, and be able to tightly lock the Dardanelles. Second, to build heavy cruisers for the Baltic. "

Taking into account the above remarks of I.V. Stalin according to the preliminary design and the results of the development of the preliminary stage of the technical design presented by the newly formed Naval Ministry (VMM) and SME, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, by a resolution of March 25, 1950, approved the main elements of the assignment for the development of technical design 82 with partial changes in the TTZ, approved in August 1948. They concerned an increase in full speed to 35 knots (by reducing the composition of the artillery of the UK and MZA, the amount of ammunition of all calibers, a reduction in displacement to 36,000-36,500 tons, cruising range and autonomy) and allowed the SME to proceed to the technical one without adjusting the draft design, with its submission for approval by the government in February 1951. At the same time, SMEs were obliged to begin in the second quarter of the same year the construction of two Project 82 ships at factories No. 444 (former No. 198) in Nikolaev and No. 189 in Leningrad, with their delivery to the Navy in 1954 and 1955, respectively. The decision of VMM and ICP on the preliminary materials of the technical project 82, related to the choice of the main dimensions and general location of the ship, was approved in September 1950.

According to the recollections of the head of the weapons department of the TsKB-16 V.I. Efimov, who had to go on long business trips to Moscow three times for the time of consideration and approval of project 82 in SMEs, VMM and the government, the central office then worked according to a special regime: in the ministries the working day began at 9 o'clock, from 19 to 22 o'clock there was a break for rest, then returned to work, where they were delayed until 2 or 3 am. During these evening hours, government meetings were held with the participation of Stalin, and it was possible to call the responsible officials of the ministries, heads of enterprises and chief designers. Chief designer of the project 82 L.V. Dikovich repeatedly reported together with the Minister of Shipbuilding Industry A.A. Goreglyad (later - with V.A.Malyshev) about the course of design and construction of these cruisers personally I.V. Stalin in his office in the Kremlin.

In October 1950 N.N. Isanin and L.V. Dikovich was awarded the title of chief designer of the first (highest) degree, established by a government decree of October 15, 1949.

During the design, a significant amount of research and development work was carried out. The most important of them were: determination of the optimal version of the theoretical contours of the ship's hull based on the results of testing the running and seaworthiness of scale models in the experimental pools of the TsNII im. acad. A.N. Krylov and TsAGI them. NOT. Zhukovsky, testing the durability of onboard and deck armor by shooting and detonating cemented and homogeneous armor plates, choosing the optimal design of the PMZ by detonating twenty large-scale (1: 5) compartments, studying the effect of "muzzle gas cones" of artillery, prototyping the main premises of the power plant, power compartments , ammunition cellars and main combat posts; theoretical research various issues related to the use of new technology.

A number of experimental works carried out were distinguished by their special novelty and large volume. Tests of large-scale PKZ compartments by detonation were carried out by an interdepartmental commission chaired by the director of TsNII-45 V.I. Pershina. On their basis, TsKB-16 developed an optimal design, which had significant advantages over well-known foreign ones (with the same resistance to explosion energy - 10% less weight).

Major experimental work was also: shooting and detonating armor plates, as a result of which the optimal scheme for booking a ship was determined, studying the effect of muzzle gases on personnel and superstructure structures, which made it possible to solve the issue of rational placement of artillery installations and open combat posts.

In December 1950, the technical project 82 was completed and in February of the following year it was submitted for consideration and approval by the VMM and SME.

The main co-executors and counterparties of TsKB-16 for weapons, mechanisms and equipment did not stop developing their projects and design documentation even during the period of adjusting the ship's elements. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1951, they were able to transfer the RKD into production. A number of samples of auxiliary mechanisms of the power plant were manufactured and adopted by the MVK, thanks to the combination of the design stages, the release of the design documentation and the preparation of production, by the end of 1950.

By the end of 1950, by the end of 1950, dozens of teams from research institutes, design bureaus and shipbuilding and related industries, including such largest enterprises, like Izhora, Kirovsky, Metallichesky im. Stalin, "Bolshevik", "Electrosila", Novokramatorsky, "Barrikady", Kharkov turbine generator, Kaluga turbine plants and many others. M.S. Mikhailov, who headed the naval surveillance before the war during the design and construction of Project 23 battleships.

Since the end of 1950, without waiting for the approval of the project, TsKB-16 began, by decision of VMM and SME, to release RKD to ensure the government's deadlines for the start of construction of the project 82 MRT simultaneously at both construction plants. Based on the results of the consideration of the technical design materials, in mid-April 1951, a joint decision of the VMM and the SME was issued, in accordance with which the bureau corrected the documents defining the main technical characteristics of the ship. In May of the same year, VMM and SME submitted them to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which, by a decree of June 4, 1951, approved the technical project 82, the main technical and technical elements of the ship and measures to ensure its construction.

On November 14 of the same year, a government decree was adopted on the construction of a third heavy cruiser at plant number 402 in Molotovsk.

In accordance with the technical design, the purpose of the ship was:

Giving combat stability to light forces operating as part of maneuverable formations both near and far (at sea, in the ocean) from their shores;

Direct cover of especially important convoys during the passage by sea from the actions of enemy cruising forces;

Destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203-mm and 152-mm artillery in a naval battle;

The delivery of powerful artillery strikes against especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coastlines, as in independent operations. tions, and in interaction with the flank of their troops and support for the landing.

According to the approved project, the heavy cruiser was supposed to have artillery: GK - nine 305-mm in three-gun turret mounts SM-31 (total ammunition - 720 rounds); UK - 12 130-mm in two-gun turret installations BL-109A (2400 rounds); MZA - 24 45 mm in SM-20-ZIF quad assault rifles (19,200 shots) and 40 25 mm in BL-120 quad assault rifles (48,000 shots + 2,400 in fenders).

The PUS system of the Sea-82 GK was provided by the CM-28 KDP (8 and 10 m rangefinder base) and two Zalp firing radar stations (radar). The 2 nd and 3 rd towers of the main battery had the "Grotto" radio range finders. The Zenit-82 universal caliber launcher (three sets) was provided by three SPN-500 with Yakor firing radar. Three towers of the UK had "Shtag-B" radio range finders. The fire control of the SM-20-ZIF anti-aircraft guns was carried out by three "Foot-B" radar systems.

The radio-technical armament included the Guys-2 air target detection radar (a place was reserved for the Vakhta early warning radar), the Rif surface target detection radar, the Foot-N detection and targeting radar. Electronic warfare equipment included the Mast search radar and the Corall jamming radar. Provided were two heat direction finders "Solntse-1p" and a hydroacoustic station (GAS) "Hercules-2".

The main armor belt of the citadel (the length of 57.6% of the ship's length at design waterline) was made of welded 180-mm homogeneous armor, had an angle of inclination from the vertical of 15 ° and protected the side below the average 70-75-mm main armor deck; the deepening of its lower edge amidships under the waterline was 1.7 m. The transverse bulkheads of the citadel were up to 140 (bow) and 125 mm (aft) thick. The upper twin deck was protected by 50 mm armor of the side and upper deck. The armor of the lower deck in the citadel was 15–20 mm thick. The armoring of the extremities included a 50 mm side belt and the same armor of the middle deck. The walls of the main command post were up to 260 mm thick, the roof - 110 mm; wire protection pipe - 100 mm; the frontal armor of the GK towers - 240, their side walls - 225, the roof - 125 mm, the rear wall that served as a counterweight - 400–760 mm (of three plates), the barbets of the GK towers - 200–235 mm. The UK towers and their barbets were protected by 25 mm armor.

Vertical booking of the citadel provided protection against 203-mm armor-piercing shells from distances of 65–75 kbt, and horizontal armor - up to 175 kbt. The rest of the vertical and horizontal armor was chosen based on protection against 152-mm high-explosive shells and 500-kg high-explosive bombs dropped from an altitude of 3000 m.

Heavy cruiser of project 82, cross-section of 81.7 shp. (see aft):

1 - room for fans; 2 - midshipmen's cabin; 3 - corridor; 4 - 305-mm turret AU SM-31; 5 - modular RU; 6 - fan baffle; 7- team premises; 8 - KATS-100; 9 - electrical equipment room.

Heavy cruiser of project 82, cross-section of 108 shp. (see aft):

I - boiler room; 2 - equipment for receiving fuel; 3 - corridor; 4 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 5 - aggregate radar "Rif-A"; 6 - lobby; 7 - flagship salon; 8 - communications command post; 9 - main command post; 10 - 45 cm signal spotlight;

II - heat direction finder "Solntse-1P"; 12 - radio direction finder frame; 13 - antenna of VHF radio station R-610; 14 - antenna post (AP) of the Fakel-MZ radar; 15-AP radar "Mast"; 16-APRS "Foot-N"; 17-APRS "Fakel-MO"; 18 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 19 - antenna of VHF radio station R-609; 20 - AP radar "Zalp"; 21 - KDP SM-28; 22 - pelorus; 23 - combat information post; 24 - aggregate radar station "Yakor"; 25 - "Foot-N" aggregate radar.

The PMZ, which covered the vital compartments of the ship (ammunition cellars, main posts, power plant premises) along the citadel from detonating a charge of 400-500 kg (in TNT equivalent), consisted of three to four longitudinal bulkheads. Of these, the second (8-25 mm) and third (50 mm) were cylindrical, while the first (8-45 mm) and fourth (15-30 mm) were flat. The volumes between the first (second) and third bulkheads were used for fuel (which, as it was consumed, was replaced by seawater). To increase the length of the armor protection vertically, additional armor plates 20-100 mm thick were hung on the third (main protective) bulkhead of the PMZ.

Also, for the first time in domestic shipbuilding, these heavy cruisers also provided for a three-layer bottom protection, made along a longitudinal-transverse system along the citadel. Its height from the outer skin to the third bottom was 2250 mm. The outer skin was made of armor 20 mm thick, the second bottom was 18 mm thick, and the third one was 12–18 mm thick. The value of the ultimate charge, the detonation of which at a distance of 5 m from the bottom had to withstand such protection, was estimated at 500 kg.

The ship's hull was carried out mainly according to the longitudinal recruitment system with the distance between the frame frames in the citadel area up to 1.7 m, at the ends - up to 2.4 m and was divided by the main transverse bulkheads (6 to 20 mm thick), from the bottom to the lower deck , 23 waterproof compartments. The sectional assembly of the hull from volumetric and flat sections, adopted according to the conceptual technology developed in the project, with extensive use of welding, significantly reduced the slipway period for building the ship.

The four-shaft power plant (four GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp and 12 main boilers with a steam capacity of 110 t / h with steam parameters of 66 atm, 460 ° C) could have become the most powerful in the world for that time. In the electric power system, for the first time in the domestic practice of shipbuilding, it was envisaged to use an alternating three-phase current (380 V, 50 Hz), as current sources it was supposed to use eight turbine generators with a capacity of 750 kW and four diesel generators of 1000 kW, located in four power plants.

Developed in 1950 at the Naval General Staff, an indicative project of the staff of this heavy cruiser (1712 people and 27 people of the headquarters of the formation) provided for the ship's commander the rank of rear admiral, for the chief officer, political officer and commanders of BC-2 and BC-5 - captains of the 1st rank.

The new heavy cruiser, in essence, was a repetition of the pre-war project 69, but at a qualitatively new technical level. Its only foreign counterparts were two "large" US Navy cruisers of the "Alaska" type, which entered service in 1944 and were considered unsuccessful ships.

For 1951, it was planned to advance work on the lead ship by 10%. During the year, TsKB-16 handed over to the construction plant about 5 thousand RKD sets, which was supposed to ensure the production of 19 thousand tons of hull structures (more than half of the mass of the entire ship). However, the supply of metal and armor by the country's metallurgical enterprises turned out to be irregular, which, together with the failure to reconstruct the slipway "0", delayed the laying of the ship.

By the end of 1951, the main contractor work was at different stages of execution: from the completion of the development of the design documentation to the delivery finished products and deliveries to the construction plant. The manufacture of tower installations of the SM-31 GK began, field tests of 130-mm installations and MZA were carried out, field tests were completed with the shooting of armor plates. Debugging of prototypes of the main and auxiliary boilers was carried out. The interdepartmental commission accepted ten prototypes of auxiliary mechanisms and heat exchangers, six more were presented for interdepartmental tests, four for factory tests, for the rest of the samples, working drawings were being completed.

In the summer of 1951 N.G. Kuznetsov was recalled by Stalin from the Far East (where he had commanded the 5th Navy since February 1950) and appointed naval minister in place of Yumashev. After four and a half years, N.G. Kuznetsov again had to deal with the issues of creating a heavy cruiser of Project 82.

Heavy cruiser of project 82, cross-section of 176 shp. (see in the nose):

1 - aft engine room; 2 - radio communication post; 3 - midshipmen's cabin; 4 - galley; 5 - gyropost; 6 - ventilation shaft of the engine room; 7 - post of communication with aviation; 8 - PCB cabin; 9 - AP radar "Coral"; 10, 11 - VHF antennas of the R-610 radio station; 12 - AP radar "Fakel-MO"; 13 - AP radar "Fakel-MZ"; 14 - antenna UKVR-609; 15 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 16 -AP radar "Zalp"; 17 - reserve command post; 18 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 19 - bakery; 20 - aft central and switching post of the main caliber; 21 - fuel tank.

* With an increased supply of provisions and fresh water.

When getting acquainted with the elements of this cruiser and the decisions taken in his absence, to the question: "What is the idea of ​​such a ship?" Isachenkov replied: "Comrade Stalin said that" this ship must, at the expense of speed, dictate to the enemy the distance of the battle. " Summing up the results of the meeting, N.G. Kuznetsov described the cruiser as “a heavy, obscure ship. It is not seen that the end justifies the means. A very expensive ship ... ".

On November 8 - December 1951, 12 bottom sections of the first pyramid of the hull of the head cruiser of Project 82 (factory number 0-400, chief builder - MA Pudzinsky) were fed and installed on the upper free part of the slipway "O" of plant No. 444. The rest of the slipway was at that time occupied by the hull of the light cruiser of project 68-bis "Mikhail Kutuzov" laid down in February of the same year, which was to be launched at the end of 1952. The laying of the lead ship "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951, its launching was scheduled for November 6, 1953.

On September 9, 1952, the second ship (serial number 0-406, chief builder - VA Neopikhanov) was laid down on the slipway "A" of plant No. 189, which was given the name "Moscow". A month later, the assembly of the hull of the third ship (serial number 0-401, chief builder - A.F. Baranov) began in the northern dock chamber of the slipway shop-slipway of plant No. 402, which did not receive a name until the order was canceled. According to some reports, this plant received an order for a second ship, the construction of which, however, was not started. The delivery of all three ships was planned (according to the plan) for 1954-1955.

In early September 1951, by a joint decision, SMEs and VMM approved the specifications and drawings of the general arrangement of the technical (contractual) project. Along with the continuation of the development of the RKD for it, the contractual design for serial ships was adjusted with the introduction of changes according to the experience of building the lead, according to joint decisions, as well as according to the results of development and prototyping work. To take prompt measures at construction plants in Nikolaev and Molotovsk on issues requiring an urgent solution with the participation of TsKB-16 designers, branches of the bureau were organized there, performing the functions of designer supervision and technical assistance.

Despite the systematic control over the construction progress of Project 82 heavy cruisers and the main counterparty supplies for them by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry V.A. Malyshev, the planned targets for them were not fulfilled, the lag from the approved schedule reached several months. The actual technical readiness of the ships on January 1, 1953 was 18.8%, 7.5% and 2.5% (instead of 42.9%, 11.5% and 5.2% according to the plan).

A month after the death of I.V. Stalin, the construction of all three heavy cruisers of project 82, on the basis of a government decree of April 18, 1953 and in accordance with the order of the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering I.I. Nosenko on April 23 of the same year was terminated.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" in the exposition of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad"

These works were interrupted with a high degree of readiness of the main equipment for the ships under construction. Were fully completed contractor work on the manufacture (and partial installation on the lead ship) weapons. GEM, turbo- and diesel-generator units, a number of auxiliary mechanisms, heat exchangers, ship devices and equipment, automation systems, instruments for various purposes and other technical means.

In June 1953, the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy decided to use part of the hull of the unfinished cruiser Stalingrad, including its citadel, as a full-scale experimental compartment for checking the resistance of the structural (armor and mine) protection of the ship to the impact by fire tests in field conditions. new models of naval weapons, testing their fuses and warheads.

Branch No. 1 of the bureau in Nikolaev was instructed to develop documentation for the formation and equipment of the compartment, its descent from the slipway and towing to the test site. The work on the experimental compartment was supervised by K.I. Troshkov (chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich was appointed chief engineer - deputy chief of TsKB-16).

In 1954, the compartment was launched, and in 1956-1957 it was tested by firing cruise missiles, armor-piercing artillery shells, aerial bombs and torpedoes, without losing its buoyancy even in the absence of forces and means of fighting for survivability on it, which confirmed the high efficiency provided by the project for the protection of the cruiser.

The closest analogue and opponent of the heavy cruiser of project 82 is the American "big cruiser" "Alaska", armed with 305-mm artillery of the main company

The unfinished hulls of the other two cruisers were cut into scrap metal on the stocks of factories No. 189 and No. 402. On January 19, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the production of four 305-mm railway batteries for the coastal defense of the Navy using 12 swinging parts of the SM-33 tower installations SM-31 ships of project 82 with their delivery to the Navy in 1957-1958.

By a government decree of March 19 of the same year "On the use of material assets left over from the cessation of the construction of ships of Project 82", the ministries of transport engineering and shipbuilding industry were instructed to ensure storage at the Kharkov turbine generator plant for the production of eight TV-4 GTZA, and at factories No. 402 and No. 444 - machine and boiler equipment. The Ministry of Defense Industry was instructed to transfer to the Ministry of Defense 12 swinging parts 2M-109, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant for the BL-109A gun mounts of the lead ship.

Although the work on the creation of the newest heavy cruisers did not end with the expected results due to objective circumstances, they were very interesting and significant, given the extremely short time for the creation of Project 82 ships. This was voiced in the assessment of the work of TsKB-16 and its main collaborators on the part of the government.

At the end of 1953, the bureau received a special cash prize for a significant contribution to the solution of technical problems of the design and construction of heavy cruisers, the implementation of a significant amount of development work, the timely provision of working design documentation for all three construction plants and the provision of effective assistance in resolving issues that arose in the process of building ships of project 82. The design and construction of these ships demonstrated the high scientific and technical potential of our country, which subsequently ensured the successful solution of a number of new and broader tasks.

The citadel of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", turned into an experimental target compartment for testing new types of weapons. In May 1955, the 150-meter compartment was thrown aground during a storm at the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay. He was removed from the stones only in July 1956.

It should be noted that Project 82 heavy cruisers were the only and last heavy artillery ships in the world laid down after the end of World War II. In the USA in 1946-1949, only five heavy cruisers with 203-mm artillery of the main battery (full displacement up to 21,500 tons), launched during the war years, were completed, and two "large" heavy cruisers of the "Alaska" type built in 1944 "(With 305-mm main guns) were in conservation since 1947 and by the beginning of the 1960s were scrapped.

Heavy cruiser "Blucher"

Heavy cruiser is a subclass of artillery cruisers. Their construction was carried out in 1916-1953. Until 1930, heavy cruisers were called "Washington", but in 1930, according to the London Naval Treaty, the term "heavy cruiser" was officially introduced to distinguish them from smaller light cruisers armed with artillery of no more than 155 mm caliber. The artillery caliber of heavy cruisers was 203 mm, and the standard displacement was 10 thousand tons, and the artillery caliber was 203 mm. In the naval weapons system, heavy cruisers occupied an intermediate place between light and battle cruisers. Heavy cruisers were actively used in World War II and constituted an important part of the fleets of all the leading maritime powers. At the end of the war, a small number of units survived in the USA, Argentina, and Spain. In 1991, the last ships of this class were decommissioned after a long stay in reserve.

Standard "Washington" cruiser

In 1915, the British Admiralty ordered a series of cruisers to the industry, having finished with the German cruisers-raiders, ordered the industry a series of cruisers, fearing new hypothetical German raiders with powerful weapons. These cruisers were supposed to surpass any promising German cruiser in all respects. Since the armament of the expected opponents was supposed to be in the form of 150-mm guns, the Admiralty wished to see on the newest "raider fighters" the largest-caliber artillery, which would still allow manual loading, and at the same time would exceed the German 150-mm guns in firing range. As a result, the new cruisers received 190 mm guns. However, the construction of Hawkins-class cruisers eventually dragged on, and the ships did not get into the First World War.

In 1922, at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Arms, it was decided to limit the quality characteristics of ships, including cruisers. The British did not want to part with the newest and very expensive ships, so they insisted on accepting the characteristics of the Hawkins as standard. This was greatly facilitated by the impression that the Hawkins made on the naval circles of the world. For example, the United States and Japan immediately began to develop cruisers, at least equal to the British innovations.

As a result, the main contracting parties were quite sympathetic to the wishes of the British delegation. This is how Articles XI and XII of the Washington Treaty of 1922 appeared, forbidding the construction of cruisers with a displacement of more than 10 thousand tons (British long tons) and with artillery larger than 203 mm. The number of newly built cruisers was not limited, but there were total restrictions on the tonnage of the fleet in the proportion: 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75, respectively, for the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Since a moratorium was declared on the construction of battleships, the "cruising" fever began.