Former early warning radar "Daryal. Russia closed the radar in Gabala Gabala radar and similar where

The State Commissions of Azerbaijan and Russia continue to close the Gabala radar station. The parties reached an agreement on all issues. This was announced today by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Khalaf Khalafov.

According to Khalafov, all documents have already been signed.

“We have carried out an inventory of property belonging to Russia. All organizational issues related to the transportation of property have been resolved. Now the process is ongoing. Most of this property was delivered to Russia. Only a small part remains, work in this direction is being implemented according to the schedule we have determined. This process will be completed shortly. In this regard, all conditions have also been created for the transportation of the contingent and its property,” the diplomat said.

Due to the fact that on December 9, 2012, the “Agreement on the status, principles and operating conditions of the Gabala radar station between the governments of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation” expired, the Russian side sent a note to stop the operation of the radar station from December 10 this year.

Let's remember the history of the station itself and the history of the issue of its lease.

For the first time in the world, the idea of ​​early (over-the-horizon) detection of aircraft in the short-wave range of waves at a distance of up to 3000 km was proposed in 1946 by the designer N.I. Kabanov. Subsequently, the research work "Veer" was carried out, which in 1949 ended with the construction of a mock-up model of an over-the-horizon radar that monitored missile launches from Baikonur at a distance of 2500 km.

The need to create long-range radar stations (RLS) designed to solve the problems of warning about a missile attack and detecting objects in space was due to the appearance in service of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and spacecraft (SC), the tightening of US military doctrine and the growth of the arms race .

Work on the creation of a long-range warning radar (RLS) began in 1954 by a special decision of the USSR Government, which was instructed to develop proposals for the creation of an anti-missile defense (ABM) in Moscow. As its most important elements, the DO radar was considered, on the creation of which a team of specialists began to work under the leadership of A.L. Mints. These powerful stations at a distance of several thousand kilometers were supposed to detect enemy missiles, their warheads and determine their coordinates with high accuracy. In 1956, by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On missile defense" A.L. Mintz was appointed one of the chief designers of the early warning radar. In the same year, work was launched in Kazakhstan to study the reflective parameters of real warheads of ballistic missiles launched from the Kapustin Yar test site.

At the end of 1960s. along the perimeter of the state border of the USSR, the construction of the first early warning stations "Dnestr" and "Dnepr" began, which formed a continuous radar barrier with a length of more than 5 thousand kilometers. A command post was set up in the Moscow region with communication lines to the Baikonur cosmodrome, where an anti-space defense complex was being installed at that time. In the course of regular tests conducted in November 1968, for the first time in the world, a target satellite was shot down without the use of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, this modernized complex, put into service in 1979, was named IS-1 (“Satellite Fighter”).

Radar nodes (RLU) and complexes (RLK) based on radars of the Dniester, Dnepr, Daugava, Daryal and Don-2N types are the basis of the country's rocket-comic defense (RKO) and function as part of systems space control (SKKP), missile attack warning (EWS), anti-space (PKO) and anti-missile (ABM) defense. Radars for the detection of satellites (OS) and early detection (RO) of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) solve the problems of their timely detection and subsequent issuance of information about them for targeting weapons. The OS nodes of the PKO and KKP systems as part of several Dnestr-type radars with high-performance computing systems were created in Irkutsk (OS-1) and Balkhash (OS-2) and are connected to the Central Command Post (CCP) of the PKO and KKP systems.

Nodes of RO early warning systems (in Murmansk - RO-1, in Riga - RO-2, in Sevastopol - RO-4, in Mukachevo - RO-5, in Pechora - RO-30, in Gabala - RO-7), except for RO- 30 and RO-7 were equipped with Dnestr-M and Dnepr type radars in a configuration of two sector radars. At the RO-30 and RO-7 nodes, Daryal-type radars with high radiated power, spaced active transmitting and receiving phased arrays with digital signal processing for detecting and tracking targets were installed. The RO-1 node (Murmansk) was strengthened by the commissioning of a fundamentally new receiving radar of the Daugava type with a large-aperture phased array of the meter range, as a result of which an active-passive radar was created, operating on the basis of the probing signals of the Dnepr radar. This significantly increased the capabilities of the RO-1 to operate in a complex space-rocket and jamming environment. Subsequently, the technical solutions used in the Daugava radar were used in the development of receiving phased arrays for the Daryal series radar.

Separate radar stations, radar nodes and radar complexes, command posts located along the perimeter of the country's territory and separated by thousands of kilometers from each other were combined into a single missile attack warning system. After the modernization of the RLC units OS-1 and OS-2 of the PKO and KKP systems, they were included in the unified early warning system. Since the mid 80s. the development and improvement of the PRN, KKP, PKO and ABM systems was carried out within the framework of the country's unified missile and space defense system.

Currently, ground-based detection tools include: Pechora, Murmansk, Minsk, Gabala (Mingachevir), Balkhash and Irkutsk nodes; early warning means from the missile defense system; the main and spare gearbox early warning system with the Crocus system.

The continuous development of air attack means increased the requirements for the effectiveness of early warning systems. In this regard, RTI proposed a project for a new practically global space system for detecting launches of ballistic missiles and creating a dual-band peripheral radar field and a new heavy-duty anti-jamming radar for early warning systems. They were supposed to become the basis of new nodes and replace the radar with existing ones, thereby "closing" the ring of the country's peripheral radar field.

Two alternative projects were developed: the first (Daryal radar) was presented by RTI employees headed by V.M. Ivantsov (1971-1972), the second ("Daryal-S") - NIIDAR employees headed by A.N. Musatov (1973). The station of the RTI project assumed the use of a new (phase) method for scanning space based on the use of a phased antenna array (PAR), the possibility of a technical and technological breakthrough in the field of creating high-potential radars. The radar of the second project retained the principles of building a station of the Danube family (frequency scanning method with continuous radiation), and also made it possible to use the existing technological and industrial base for its implementation, but did not promise significant progress in the field of radar technology. Despite the fact that both projects met the requirements of the assignment, the first project with the Darial radar won, and V.M. was appointed its chief designer. Ivantsov, the first deputy - A.M. Skosyrev.

The essence of the first project was based on the phased development of the early warning radar field of the meter range, bringing the characteristics of all radar nodes to the characteristics of the Daryal radar. The basis of this program was the so-called universal receiving position (UPP) and typical transmitting position (TPP). The SCP made it possible to receive and process the signals reflected from the target emitted by the Dnepr locator, and differed from the receiving position of the Daryal radar in its great control and noise immunity capabilities. Further improvement of the node was ensured by the replacement of the Dnepr with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, working in conjunction with the UPP previously created at the node.

The Daryal radar is distinguished by an increased energy potential (radiation power of about 2 MW), which ensures the detection of targets the size of a soccer ball at a distance of up to 6000 km in a field of view of 110 degrees. in azimuth, increased accuracy of measuring parameters, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects.

The station consists of 2 spaced apart positions - a universal receiving position (UCP), which had the best performance in control and security in comparison with the receiving part of the Dnepr radar, and a typical transmitting position (TPP). At the same time, both positions are compatible with the positions of the Dnepr radar. This allows you to gradually upgrade the functioning node with the Dnepr radar to the characteristics of the Daryal radar. At the first stage, the ORTU housed the SCP, capable of receiving and processing signals emitted by the Dnepr radar, and at the second stage, replacing the Dnepr radar itself with the Chamber of Commerce. The transmitting center was a multi-storey building about 100 m high, on the front inclined part of which there was a phased array, the basis of which was 40x40 m antennas, consisting of 1260 transmitters. The receiving part of the radar "Daryal" was the world's first adaptive phased array of the meter range, which consisted of 4048 receiving cross-vibrators with 8096 amplifiers. The antenna was located in an 18-storey building. Many of the advantages of the Daryal radar were provided by a high-performance computer system that controlled the operation of the radar, controlled the operation of its devices and automatically processed information, and also solved other additional tasks. The development of the radar was carried out on models of the receiving and transmitting centers without creating an experimental sample. The Daugava radar station was used as a model of the receiving part, transmitting the model (9 transmitters and an antenna of 27 vibrators) at the Sary-Shagan training ground next to the former TsSO-P radar station.

By decision of 1975, 2 nodes were created on the basis of the Daryal radar station - RO-30 (near the city of Pechora) and RO-7 (near the city of Gabala, Azerbaijan). In the spring of 1975, the accelerated construction of the RO-30 unit began, which at the end of 1983 successfully completed joint tests, and in March 1984 was put into service. The Gabala radar station (RO-7 unit) was successfully tested by the end of 1984, and on February 19, 1985 it was put into service. The station is designed to detect launches of ballistic missiles in the Indian Ocean, is not capable of processing information on its own, and works in conjunction with its receiving and processing centers Kvadrat and Shvertbot near Moscow. With the commissioning of these nodes, the early warning system could detect attacking ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles.

Radar "Daryal-U" (chief designer A.A. Vasiliev) from the station "Daryal" was distinguished by a lower energy potential, 2 times fewer transmitters at the transmitting position and a significant increase in the ability to control this potential. This ensured the optimal distribution of radiated energy in the mode of review and target tracking due to signal splitting. The range resolution, noise immunity (due to the implementation of the receiving phased array adaptation mode), the power of the computing complex based on the M-13 multiprocessor computer were increased (up to 2.4 billion operations per second, which made it possible to implement digital signal processing and significantly improve the operation algorithm radar).

The modified radar "Daryal-UM" (chief designer V.M. Ivantsov) was distinguished by changes in the receiving and transmitting positions. Scanning sectors were increased in the SCP and losses at its edges were reduced, in the CCI - scanning sectors, the efficiency of transmitters were increased, their design was improved, and more.

The radar station controls the territories of Iran, Turkey, China, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Australia, as well as most of the African countries, the islands of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.

A distinctive feature of the station is the ability not only to detect a missile launch in a record short time, but also to track the missile trajectory from the first seconds of launch and transmit data in advance for interception at the desired point.

The Daryal-type radar has a phased antenna array of the receiving center 100 × 100 m (almost 4000 vibrator crosses) and a PAR aperture of the transmitting center measuring 40x40 m (1260 powerful transmitting replaceable modules with an output pulse power of each 300 kW), provides target detection with an EPR of the order 0.1 m at a distance of up to 6000 km in a field of view of 110 degrees in azimuth. It is distinguished by increased accuracy of measuring parameters, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the radar detected 139 live launches of Iraqi Scud missiles.

The object "Daryal" is a 17-storey building with a height of 87 m. Its creators were awarded the State Prize of the USSR.

The number of service personnel is about 900 military personnel and more than 200 civilian specialists (an intergovernmental agreement sets a limit of 1.5 thousand people).

Voronezh - DM

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia leased the plant from Azerbaijan, paying $7 million a year to rent the facility, which, in general, was built by Russia.

Both Russia and Azerbaijan were quite satisfied with such relations: our neighbors received an increase in the budget, and we had a reliable object for the country's defense. Russia had plans to modernize the radar and extend its service life. According to the then Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, Russia is interested in maintaining the same cost of rent, but at the same time wants to drastically reduce the territory occupied by the station. The station will be completely rebuilt; with its new look, a large amount of communications will not be needed. By 2020, it was planned to build a new generation radar station (of the Voronezh VP type) in its place.

Negotiations were underway between the two countries to continue the lease of the strategic facility until 2025. But quite unexpectedly, Azerbaijan wanted to increase the rent to a fantastic $300 million, that is, almost 40 times! It was clear that this was a poorly concealed desire to squeeze Russia out of Gabala. Naturally, such a price did not suit us, and at the end of December, our military left the radar station in Azerbaijan.

On December 10, 2012, the Russian side suspended the operation of the Gabala radar station.

Now the versions explaining what happened. First, behind this unfriendly step are the intrigues of the Americans, who want to weaken our air defense system before the war with Iran. Well, from the point of view of geopolitical - a well-founded explanation. However, people who are dedicated today suddenly have another version, much more worldly. Let's present it too. One of the major Azerbaijani businessmen was involved in the production chain for the execution of the state defense order of Russia and had a very fat piece of the pie from this.

However, at some point, in the course of the “redistribution of financial flows” (as it seems to be called now?), He was deprived of this piece, pushed to the sidelines of the process. And in retaliation, the hot southern man pulled off a large-scale intrigue with the help of Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev. As a result, by joint efforts, the intriguers persuaded President Aliyev to raise the price for renting the radar station to Moscow to heaven. This is how, due to disputes between “specific” businessmen, Russia has to leave the Gabala radar station.

The next and main question is: how much will our defense capability suffer from such a step? For an answer, let's turn to one of the authoritative military experts, the editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine, Igor Korotchenko. His conclusion is not so fatal: after leaving Gabala, there will be no significant losses for our defense capability. All tasks for monitoring the southern regions of the planet will now be assigned to a new generation radar station of the Voronezh type, which was launched back in 2009 in Armavir. This is a station with a high degree of prefabrication with a modular construction principle, that is, it is more functional, modern and designed for constant modernization. The Armavir radar station has a more extended tracking sector, and it is impossible to hide a single combat missile launch towards Russia from its keen “eye”.

Thus, the “bang” of our Azerbaijani partners only pushed the Russian Armed Forces to further modernization (I am talking about this seriously, without any irony). New stations are much cheaper, easier and faster to build - a year and a half instead of the previous seven years that took to build huge concrete monsters.

New radar stations are the eyes and ears of our aerospace defense system, Igor Korotchenko emphasized, and Russia will build as many of them as it takes to fully control all missile-hazardous areas. As for Azerbaijan, let's put it this way, he made a mistake. Russia greatly appreciated the trusting relations that existed between our countries. Let's not forget that a huge number of Azerbaijanis live and work with us. However, the unfriendly demarche made by the leadership of the republic is unlikely to affect our attitude towards its citizens living in Russia. Nevertheless, in international relations there is a principle of reciprocity, in other words, as it comes around, it will respond. I hope that our country will not take petty revenge on Azerbaijan for what happened, but, of course, it will take this incident into account in its policy...

As for visible acquisitions, according to our expert, Azerbaijan will become the full-fledged owner of the cyclopean structure, stuffed with long-outdated equipment and completely useless for the Azerbaijani (and any other) army. Firstly, there are no personnel in the republic to maintain the radar station, and secondly, disconnected from the global missile attack warning system of Russia, this station is turning into a meaningless structure.

Russia's loss of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan was not the result of an astronomical increase in rent by official Baku, as is commonly believed, but American blackmail about plans to deploy a new Star Wars-type program.

At the end of 2006, the administration of President George W. Bush announced the creation in four stages of a system of missile defense elements (ABM) in Europe, which would protect European countries from nuclear missile threats from rogue states Iran, Syria, and even distant North Korea.

The Russians rightly claimed that this program was directed against Russia's national security. And in principle they were right.

Mystery of Star Wars

According to the announced program, ships equipped with Aegis systems and Standard-3 interceptor missiles have already been deployed in the Mediterranean Sea at the first stage. In addition, a missile defense radar was deployed in Turkey. At the second stage, by 2015, Washington expects to transfer mobile batteries with Standard-3 missiles to the territory of Romania, by 2018 they are supposed to be deployed in Poland.

Finally, by 2020 it was planned to put into operation such systems that are capable of protecting the entire territory of NATO countries from intercontinental ballistic missiles. Only the last stage of the missile defense system, which provides for the interception of potential enemy missiles at the initial stage of flight, is today estimated at $500 billion. If implemented, it will cover the entire territory of Russia and practically neutralize the strategic missile and space forces of the Russian Federation.

Is Russia capable of presenting an asymmetric response to the Americans? Of course not. How the USSR could not do this in response to the Star Wars program announced in 1983 by US President Ronald Reagan. The Soviets, now falling behind in power, were forced to reduce their medium and short-range missiles and reduce threats to Western Europe and American military bases.

The new Bush program frightened the Russian leadership too much, which understood that the military-technical and economic potential of the country was not able to keep up with the new arms race, if it started.

US Mystery

Bargaining this time was the condition of narrowing the range of the Russian radar survey in almost all directions along the perimeter of the borders of the Russian Federation. In this sense, it becomes clear why the radar station in Gabala took the central place in the anti-missile game.

This station carried out surveillance on the vital space for the United States from the Indian Ocean to the expanses of North Africa, where geopolitical events had already unfolded. The technical data of the station speaks not only of its ability to track flying objects, as is commonly believed.

The Gabala radar station, codenamed "Daryal", was put into operation in 1985 and provided the detection of targets the size of a soccer ball at a distance of up to 6000 km, and after modernization - 8500 km. It has increased accuracy in measuring parameters, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects, including underwater ones. The station is not capable of processing information on its own, and works in conjunction with its reception and processing centers “Kvadrat” and “Shvertbot” near Moscow. In practice, this is a powerful intelligence structure capable of tracking the actions of the Americans throughout this space, which, of course, cannot be included in the plans of the latter.

The Kremlin tried in every possible way to retain this important intelligence facility, even under American surveillance. It is no coincidence that on June 7, 2007, at the G-8 summit in Germany, President Vladimir Putin offered the US joint management of the station, which would have been a guarantee that Moscow was not spying on US activities in the region. Putin said: Russia offers America to share the capabilities of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan to conduct the necessary "anti-missile monitoring" (in particular for Iran), and if Washington accepts this proposal, there will be no need to deploy missile defense elements in Eastern European countries. This idea was rejected and the Russians, after tense negotiations, as subsequent events show, were forced to give in. The global financial crisis that broke out in 2008 put an end to this dispute, which forced Moscow to abandon not only plans for an asymmetric response, but also to narrow plans to rearm the army with conventional weapons due to a catastrophic reduction in funds.

Mystery Ann Derse

The final point on this issue was made in the fall of 2011. This can be seen from the actions of the Azerbaijani leadership, which exactly a year ago raised the cost of renting the Gabala radar station from $7 million to $300 million. This step became a formal reason for terminating the operation of the station in the future. It is clear that official Baku could never put forward such a crazy condition for two reasons:

First, Aliyev, based on the possibilities of his potential, could not go against the will of Moscow;

Second, the absence of a Russian military presence would drastically narrow Aliyev's maneuver between the US and Russia and strengthen the influence of Washington, which is pushing for democratization, which Baku does not want. Both the Americans and the Russians needed a formal diplomatic reason in the form of an exorbitant increase in the cost of rent. The last one is more to save face.

An argument in favor of the version of the necessary narrowing of Russian reconnaissance capabilities is also the fact that the Voronezh radar station in Armavir, which is being commissioned, is located outside the Greater Caucasus Range, is not capable of replacing the station in Azerbaijan. “This is a weak station and its capabilities are significantly inferior to the Gabala one, although the Russians claim the opposite ... The Russians invested $1 billion in the modernization of the Gabala radar station, and only $70 million was spent on the station in Armavir. The radius of the station in Armavir covers 2500 km, and Gabala - 8500 km ”, said WikiLeaks, citing Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, who spoke openly about this on March 14, 2009 with US Ambassador to Baku Ann Derse.

From the dispatch of Ambassador Ders dated March 19 of this year. It can be seen that Moscow, after the announcement of the American initiative to deploy a European missile defense system, conducted controversial negotiations, including the abandonment of the station in Gabala and the extension of the contract in 2012. This indicated that the issue has always been in the stage of intensive bargaining between the US and the Russian Federation.

Erdogan's secret

The fate of the station was finally sealed on September 12, 2012, when the US National Research Council recommended that the White House and Congress abandon the fourth stage of the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe. "Phase 4 should be canceled because it is not necessary for the defense of Europe and is less than optimal for the defense of the United States," concluded the authors of the report, who are experts from among retired military leaders, scientists and former US administration officials.

The center of gravity of the fourth stage of missile defense, which is less expensive, experts recommended moving far to the East. NIS advised that, in addition to the sites of Fort Greeley in Alaska and Vandenberg in California, the establishment of another silo-based interceptor missile base in the continental United States. They propose to place another similar base in the northeastern part of the United States. The conclusion of the expert council meant that the Russians abandoned the fight for Gabala in exchange for freezing the fourth stage of the American missile defense system in Europe.

On December 10, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry announced an explanation that was not taken seriously about the suspension of the work of the Gabala radar station: in the negotiations preceding the closure of the station, "readiness to continue cooperation with the Russian side" was demonstrated, but she was not satisfied with the rent.

From the text of the statement, it followed that on December 10, the Russian Foreign Ministry presented Azerbaijan with a note on the suspension of the operation of the station in connection with the "Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on the status, principles and conditions for the use of the Gabala radar station" that lost its validity on December 9, 2012. The agreement on the lease of the radar station by Russia, signed in 2002, expires on December 24, 2012.

It is interesting that this decision of Russia was announced to the whole world not from Moscow, but from Baku, which confirms that the true background of the decision on the fate of the radar station lies far beyond the borders of Azerbaijan.

On September 11, 2012, the Second meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Azerbaijan and Turkey was held in Gabala, which ended with the signing of seven documents. In terms of their significance, they did not particularly correspond to the high status of the meeting: about metrology, television partnership, rescue services, seed production and others. The meeting was previously planned in Baku, but was unexpectedly moved to a place five steps away from the Gabala radar station. This meeting, which took place almost simultaneously with the release of the US National Research Council report on missile defense, was a symbolic message from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that Russia's military era in Azerbaijan is over.

Analytical Service Turan

Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov spent the beginning of last week in Azerbaijan. The topic of his meetings and conversations with the head of the military department of this Transcaucasian republic, Colonel-General Safar Abiyev, with the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, as well as trips to the southern foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range, to the village of Gabala near Mingechevir, were the conditions for extending the terms of the lease by the domestic military department of the local radar station of the Missile Attack Warning System (EWS radar).

The station "Daryal" or Gabala radar, also known as "Laki-2", was built in these places in 1985. It was and is part of the domestic Missile Attack Warning System. The Daryal-type radar has a phased antenna array of the receiving center 100 x 100 m (almost 4000 cross-vibrators) and a PAR aperture of the transmitting center measuring 40 x 40 m (1260 powerful transmitting replaceable modules with an output pulse power of each 300 kW), provides target detection with an RCS of the order of 0.1 m at a distance of up to 6000 km in a viewing sector of 110 degrees in azimuth.

The Gabala radar is distinguished by increased accuracy in measuring parameters, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, and the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects. It operates in the meter wavelength range and, according to some publications, controls the air and outer space over Turkey, Iraq, Iran, other countries of the Middle East and even India, as well as most of the Indian Ocean, including the northern coast of Australia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Daryal radar became the property of Azerbaijan and, after lengthy negotiations with Baku, was leased by the government of the republic in 2002 to the Space Forces of the Russian Federation for 10 years with an annual payment of $7 million. About 1,400 of our officers and civilian specialists are currently working there.

Moreover, in addition to the rent, Russia pays off the energy system of Azerbaijan for the used electricity and provides jobs for local citizens, thanks to which the mountain village of Gabala is today one of the most comfortable in the country.

At the end of 2012, the lease expires, and Azerbaijan is not opposed to signing a new agreement, but with a higher price for the services provided. The figure sounds like 15 million dollars. The reasons for the increase in the cost of rent are such as receiving compensation for the material damage suffered by Baku due to the impossibility of developing tourism in this mountainous part of the country, the increase in the cost of electricity and even ... environmental problems that the high-frequency radio emission of the station brings.

We will not comment on these claims. Let's just say that the early warning system has become a "golden hook" for our southern neighbors, on which you can draw a variety of preferences from the Russian military. For example, play the transfer card "Daryal" on loan to the USA. This is nothing, as knowledgeable people understand, that if the Russians leave here, they will take with them the most valuable thing that is here - the software for the operation of the radar, without which it is just a pile of concrete and metal.

The Americans understand this too. Moreover, if they come to Gabala (let's imagine this for a moment purely virtual), then it is unlikely that Tehran, Azerbaijan's neighbor, will like it, in which there are almost twice as many Azerbaijanis as in the republic itself. And spoiling relations with Iran in this way is more expensive for Baku. But on the other hand, local authorities, playing the Gabala card, raise their geopolitical image in the eyes of the local population.

So Baku received the S-300PMU anti-aircraft missile system from Russia, not least due to the fact that it has Gabala. And, despite the formidable, let's face it, very cocky, if not aggressive statements against Yerevan, Moscow's military ally, Anatoly Serdyukov nevertheless flew in to negotiate the extension of the lease of the Daryal early warning system. He even proposes to increase the quota for training Azerbaijani military personnel in Russian military universities (I wonder if they are the same ones where Armenian military personnel study?), promises to send a group of experts so that they can agree and resolve all the issues raised by the Azerbaijani side during the negotiations within two weeks. along Gabala.

No, we are not against the fact that the Azerbaijani political and military leadership, like the leadership of any self-respecting state, defends its national interests in negotiations with the Russian military, seeks and finds its own benefits from military-technical cooperation with Moscow. In their place, as they say, everyone would have done the same.

We are not opposed to the fact that in the course of negotiations with Baku on Gabala, the Russian side made certain concessions to its partners. After all, we are close and very close neighbors who have lived in the same "communal apartment" for more than two centuries. You could say almost like brothers. But still, still, still...

We must also protect our national interests, our geopolitical, economic and military benefits in the same way as our allies and partners in the CIS do. Russia should not be a cash cow. For each concession, for each preference to an ally and partner, we must receive an adequate concession and preference so that our cooperation does not look like a donor on the one hand and a dependency on the other. Someone really needs help, and someone can pay with cash or provide geopolitical support.

In the end, we need Gabala, including because of the ongoing dispute-dialogue with the US and NATO over European missile defense. But it is worth remembering that near Armavir, a new early warning radar of high factory readiness "Voronezh-M" has already been put on experimental combat duty. And it may happen as it happened with the Ukrainian early warning stations in Mukachevo and Nikolaev, near Sevastopol - the orange government bargained with Moscow for a long time about the cost of their lease, even turned the radar into objects of the Ukrainian space agency, offered the US and NATO to take them on their own. ... It didn't work out. It turned out - neither for myself, nor for people. Now no stations, no millions of dollars to the state treasury for their rent and operation.
To whom this is a lesson, let everyone think for himself.

/Based on materials nvo.ng.ru and arms-expo.ru /

Finally a more or less sensible explanation

Gabala radar - officially called the radar station "Daryal", deployed in the village of Gabala (350 km west of Baku), not far from Ganja. Data on the number of personnel - fluctuate (from 1400 to 2000 people). It is subordinated to the Space Forces of the Russian Federation and is designed to detect ballistic and cruise missiles on flight paths, track and measure the coordinates of detected targets and jammers, as well as calculate the movement parameters of tracked targets and determine their type.

The range of the radar is up to 6-7 thousand km.
Ground-based radars with greater target detection range do not exist, to the best of our knowledge.
The decision to build the station was made in 1972 by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - in connection with the US plans to deploy a nuclear submarine base in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia Island).
In 1976 construction began. In 1983, the first radar units began to be launched. In 1984, the unit took up experimental duty. In February 1985, the station went on combat duty.

The Gabala station is facing outward (the territory of North Africa, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, as well as a significant part of the Indian Ocean) is under radar surveillance. The territory of Russia is not monitored by the station (again, we recall that turning the sector of view of such radars outside when they are located near the borders of the country is a condition of the ABM Treaty).

The Gabala station is the only one that has experience in combat launches. In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, the radar recorded all, without exception, 302 launches of cruise missiles from American bombers, surface ships and nuclear submarines, including 15 cases of missing missiles on the trajectory and 30 cases of missiles being hit by Iraqi air defenses. The radar was also actively used in the post-Soviet period - during US air operations against Iraq ("Desert Fox", 1998) and the Afghan Taliban ("Strong Freedom", 2001). The technical resource of the radar makes it possible to ensure its continuous operation until 2012.

The agreement on the Russian lease of the radar station was signed by the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan on January 25, 2002 and has already been ratified by the parliaments of both countries. According to the agreement, the Gabala radar station is the property of Azerbaijan. Russia leases the radar until 2012, and without the consent of Baku, Moscow has no right to conclude any agreements with a third party on the use of the radar. The station has the status of an information and analytical center.

So, the Gabala radar station is a Daryal-type station with a very high target detection radius (6-7 thousand km). This is one of the specification parameters. The other has to do with the relationship between radar and warfare strategy.

What is the specificity of the old and new technological (and hence military, and hence political) era? The previous era - also known as the "era of mutually assured destruction" - is the entire aggregate system in which Gabala is inscribed.

The specificity of this consistency lies in the fact that Gabala (like the entire system of early warning of a missile attack - SPRN) was "sharpened" for the instantaneous detection of a missile attack on the USSR, which guarantees the leadership of the USSR the necessary time to make a decision on a retaliatory nuclear missile attack. hit.

The leadership, having decided on this strike, could thereby ensure the following.

First, guaranteed retribution. Which was of decisive importance.

Secondly, the suppression of certain radar capabilities that turn American missiles into blind ones already in the middle of a flight. This second possibility had no absolute significance. But it was also important.

We could not protect the entire territory of the USSR from nuclear missiles if they were already launched. The Americans could not protect themselves from our missiles either. That was the old era.

At that time, the missile defense system existed only around Moscow. And in this form it exists to this day. At that time, their missile defense system also protected only the area where their key strategic potential was based - silo ICBMs in North Dakota.

Gabala was focused on a nuclear attack by a super-powerful adversary (not some kind of Iran, but the United States, which decided to wage a nuclear war to completely destroy the USSR). And on the "strike of retaliation." All this is reflected in the technical solution. And all this is very different from what the Americans are now "kneading".

The Americans (at least declaratively) want to protect themselves from individual "adventurous" missiles, and not from a massive strike to destroy the United States. Is such a desire only a declaration (behind which is the desire to be safe from Russian missiles that can be fired after the Americans launch the first strike), or is it a real strategy? Let those who are supposed to answer. In the official statements we have already cited by officials (that is, those who are "supposed to"), it was said that the Americans want to protect themselves from our "retaliation strike", and not Europe from Iran. Now officials may say otherwise. But this, as they say, is a matter of life.

Already today, the Americans want to chase every single missile that is aimed at the point they want to protect. They want to protect themselves. But precisely all of its territory. They say that they also want to protect Europe, NATO allies, all friendly countries and all progressive humanity.